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Symposium
THE NEBRASKA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
AN INTRODUCTION AND ARTICLES 1 AND 2*
By William B. Davenport *
On July 5, 1963, the development of commercial law in Ne-
braska received a gigantic forward thrust-a thrust necessary to
bring that development even with the jet age. On that date Gover-
nor Frank Morrison approved Legislative Bill No. 49 of the 73rd
Session of the Nebraska Legislature enacting the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. In one sweep of the pen' Nebraska had law (or
would, in September, 1965,2 have law) in areas where none has
existed previously-either in statutory or decisional form, law
which it had taken even the most important commercial states and
the British common law jurisdictions hundreds of years to develop.
Drafting Bodies
The Uniform Commercial Code is undoubtedly the most monu-
mental single piece of legislation ever conceived and drafted. It
*The author expresses his deep appreciation to the staff of the Nebraska
Law Review for their cooperation and assistance in the preparation of this
article. The author is indebted particularly to Mr. Vincent L. Dowding
for his research of Nebraska decisions and statutes in the areas covered
by this article. Without this invaluable assistance the author, a practicing
Illinois lawyer, would never have sought to endeavor to tell Nebraska
lawyers how the Uniform Commercial Code affected the law of their state
in the covered areas. The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely
those of the author.
**A.B. 1948, J.D. 1950, University of Illinois. Partner, Raymond, Mayer,
Jenner & Block, Chicago. Member, Subcommittee No. 1 of the Per-
manent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. Chairman,
Subcommittee on Sales, Bulk Sales and Documents of Title, Committee
on Uniform Commercial Code, Section of Corporation, Banking & Busi-
ness Law, American Bar Association. Editor and co-author, Illinois Code
Comments to Uniform Commercial Code (Smith Hurd Ill. Annot.
Statutes).
I The phrase, as used here, is probably only a figure of speech. Governors(like presidents) are noted for their use of a multiplicity of pens when
it comes to signing bills embodying key legislation-in which category
the Code clearly falls.
2 Nebraska U.C.C. § 10-101. The Code will be published in a separate
chapter and volume, which may be cited as follows: NEB. Rav. STAT.
§§ 90-1-101 to 90-10-104 (1964). The Code will be cited herein, e.g.,
as U.C.C. § 1-105, except in the few instances where there is a Nebraska
variation of the Uniform Code, in which instance the citation will read
"Nebraska U.C.C."
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was, so to speak, 18 years on the drawing boards-from the time
of the original proposal of the idea of a comprehensive commercial
code in 1940 by William A. Schnader, then president of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, until the
publication of the 1958 Official Text. The magnitude of the Code
project was such that the National Conference requested and ob-
tained the participation of the American Law Institute, the body
which had proposed and promulgated the Restatements of the Law
which have received such widespread acceptance by the courts.
These two bodies are the joint draftsmen and sponsors of the
Code.
Enactment by Majority of States
Nebraska became the 28th state to adopt the Code. By the
time it becomes effective in Nebraska (September 2, 1965) it will
have become the governing law in 27 other states and the District
of Columbia. Undoubtedly it will also have been adopted by several
more of the states, since the trend is to make it uniform in fact as
well as in name.3 As was the case in several of the prior states in
which the Code has been adopted, the Nebraska Legislature en-
acted the Code without a dissenting vote.4
Coverage
The panorama of the Code is the coverage of a commercial
transaction involving any kind of personal property from begin-
ning to end. Its scope will more fully appear from a perusal of
this and subsequent articles in this symposium. Since the back-
ground of the Code has been adequately covered in prior legal
literature, the writer will say no more other than to refer the
interested reader to background articles.5
3The court took judicial note of this trend in Churchill Motors, Inc. v.
A. C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 560, 563, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570, 574 (4th
Dep't 1962).
4 The vote on final passage of the Code bill in the Nebraska Legislature
was 28-0. Fifteen members did not vote. In Illinois the Code was passed
by both houses of the General Assembly without a dissenting vote at
any stage of the legislative proceedings. Other states in which the Code
was enacted unanimously include Connecticut, Kentucky and Pennsyl-
vania.
5 Schnader, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Commercial Code, 37 TEMP.
L.Q. 265 (1964); Schnader, The New Movement Toward Uniformity in
Commercial Law - The Uniform Commercial Code Marches On, 13
Bus. LAw. 646 (1958); Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code: Review,
Assessment, Prospect -November, 1959, 15 Bus. LAw. 348 (1960).
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Delayed Effective Date
The delayed effective date serves to give the banking and
business community ample time in which to prepare to operate
under the Code. The Nebraska Legislature, like those of Oregon
and New York,6 has given more than ample time in this respect.
Members of the Nebraska Bar, however, need not, and indeed
should not, wait so long to become familiar with the Code. The
Code is presently the governing law of twenty-one states,7 including
several commercially important states. Undoubtedly numerous
transactions of the clients of Nebraska lawyers will have a Code
nexus. Further, it is not at all unlikely that the Supreme Court
of Nebraska, as other courts have done, may apply to a pre-Code
transaction a rule set forth in the Code either on the basis that
the Code is a sound restatement of current commercial law or a
declaration of current legislative policy.8 The Code represents
6 In Oregon the Code bill was approved by the governor on June 2, 1961,
and the Code became effective on September 1, 1963. In New York the
Code bill was approved by the governor on April 18, 1962 and becomes
effective September 27, 1964. The legislatures of the three states have
thus delayed the effective date more than two years, longer than in any
of the other 25 states which have enacted the Code. The purpose, of
course, is to permit a subsequent session of the legislature to remove
any defects that are discovered in the interim before the effective date.
7The twenty-one states in which the Code is presently effective are
Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ten-
nessee, West Virginia and Wyoming. The remaining jurisdictions, in
addition to Nebraska, where it will take effect at later dates are Cali-
fornia, District of Columbia, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New York,
Virginia and Wisconsin.
8In Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817
(3rd Cir. 1951), the court applied a Code rule to a transaction in
Delaware (which still has not adopted the Code) with the observation:
"We think provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which do not
conflict with statute or settled case law are entitled to as much respect
and weight as courts have been inclined to give to the various Restate-
ments. It, like the Restatements, has the stamp of approval of a large
body of American scholarship." Id. at 822, n.9.
In Gresham State Bank v. 0 and K tonstr. Co., 231 Ore. 106, 370
P.2d 726, 732 (1962), clarified on rehearing, 372 P.2d 187 (1962), the
court followed a principle set forth in § 3-406 of the Code on the ground
that it conformed "to the view taken, at least tentatively, by the 1961
Legislative Assembly in adopting [the Code] with a postponed effective
date." The Code was also cited as authority for conclusions reached in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
and In the Matter of Doughboy Indus., Inc. and Pantasote Co., 17 App.
Div. 2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962).
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current thinking in commercial law and is a body of law with
which practitioners in all jurisdictions should be familiar, ir-
respective of whether it has been enacted or is the currently govern-
ing law.
Nebraska Variations from Uniform Code
The Nebraska Legislature adopted the 1958 Official Text of
the Code with four intentional variations.9 Since publication of
the 1958 Official Text by the joint sponsors, the Permanent Edi-
torial Board10 has promulgated its Report No. 1 in 1962 recommend-
ing enactment of several uniform amendments. The sponsors of
the Code have now published the 1962 Official Text, a consolidation
of the 1958 Official Text and the amendments recommended in the
1962 Report of the Permanent Editorial Board.
Organization
One of the key assets of the Code is its organization. It is
divided into ten articles. Each article, except 5, 6 and 10, is further
subdivided into parts. Each article, part and section are appropri-
9 The intentional Nebraska variations from the 1958 Official Text are four
in number: §§ 1-201(26), 9-302(3) (b), 9-401(1), and 9-403, which con-
tains a subsection (6) not found in the Official Text.
10 On August 5, 1961, the joint sponsors of the Code created a Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code for the purpose of
expressing opinions on unauthorized amendments which had been in-
corporated in codes already enacted or proposing amendments suggested
by its members or by others. Amendments may be approved and
promulgated by the Board when
"(a) It has been shown by experience under the Code that a par-
ticular provision is unworkable or for any other reason obviously re-
quires amendment; or
(b) Court decisions have rendered the correct interpretation of a
provision of the Code doubtful and an amendment can clear up the
doubt; or
(c) New commercial practices shall have rendered any provisions
of the Code obsolete or have rendered new provisions desirable; or
(d) An amendment or a group of amendments would, in the opinion
of the Board after investigation, lead to the wider acceptance of the
Code by states which have not as yet enacted it, and would likely be
enacted by those states which have already adopted the Code."
In its REPORT No. 1, referred to in the text, the Board recommended
uniform amendments to the 1958 Official Text of the Code, disapproved
prior non-uniform amendments made in the various states, and amended
the Official Comments to several sections. For further information on
the work of the Board and current problems see Braucher, The Uni-
Form Commercial Code -A Third Look?, 14 W. REs. L. REV. 7 (1962).
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ately captioned. The first two numbers of each section refer re-
spectively to the article and part in which the section may be
found. Numerous parenthetical cross-references, both in the text
of the Code and in the definitional cross-references in the Official
Comments, make it relatively easy quickly to find the pertinent
provision of the Code which the practitioner is seeking. The or-
ganization and content of the Code will appear in substantially
complete range from this and subsequent articles in this symposium.
In the light of this comparatively brief background, it will be
the purpose of this article to consider the content of Articles 1
and 2 of the Code and their impact upon prior Nebraska commercial
law.
ARTICLE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article I coordinates and integrates the eight substantive
Articles (2-9) into a code. A possible danger to the general prac-
titioner is a tendency to overlook Article I by the very reason of
its generality. The practitioner may feel that an article so entitled
probably contains no more than a statement of purposes, rules of
construction, general definitions and the like. Article I does con-
tain these; but it also contains important rules of general applica-
tion to commercial transactions which the practitioner cannot
afford to overlook. Along with whatever article or articles the
general practitioner may be working in his everyday practice under
the Code,' he should be thoroughly familiar with Article 1.
For the greater part Article I represents a continuation of or
an addition to pre-Code Nebraska commercial law. Only in two
instances, apparently, are prior well settled rules reversed in
Article 1.
Article 1 is divided into two parts entitled:
Part 1-Short Title, Construction, Application and Subject
Matter of the Act.
" The Articles which every general practitioner will meet regularly in
his everyday practice are 2-Sales, 6-Bulk Transfers, and 9-Secured
Transactions. Institutes on continuing legal education of the members
of the bar have emphasized Articles 9 and 6 in that order as the "bread
and butter" Articles. However, Article 2 is receiving, and properly,
increased recognition as a "bread and butter" Article. The general
practitioner will be concerned less frequently with problems under
Articles 3 and 7 and part 4 of Article 4. Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are
of interest to lawyers for financial institutions in particular.
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Part 2-General Definitions and Principles of Interpretation.
The Article thus contains general statements and rules of con-
struction concerning the Code itself and general substantive rules
applicable to transactions within the scope of the Code. For con-
venience the text will consider the Article under these latter two
groupings.
General Statements and Rules of Construction
Article 1 contains the general provisions that one would expect
to find in any Code: the title,12 a statement of purposes,13 rules of
construction, 14 a severability provision 15 and general definitions
used throughout the Code.16
One of the purposes of the Code is to make uniform commercial
law among the various jurisdictions. 17 In view of the interpretation
12 U.C.C. § 1-101. This is the convenient, short title by which the Code
may be known rather than the lengthy title which appears at the
beginning of all Code bills. While the Nebraska Constitution, in Article
3, § 14, provides, "No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the
same shall be clearly expressed in the title," no constitutional problem
under this clause is forecast. As have most other state courts of last
resort, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has given the title provision a
liberal construction. State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173
Neb. 195, 203, 113 N.W.2d 63, 68-69 (1962). Perhaps the most liberal
decision along this line is Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 294
Ky. 122, 171 S.W.2d 41 (1943) (constitutionality of single act revising
all statute laws of Kentucky was sustained on ground that revision of
all the statutes was a single subject).
13 U.C.C. § 1-102 (2).
'4U.C.C. §§ 1-102(1), (4) and (5); 1-104 and 1-106. Section 1-102(4)
eliminates concern over the use in numerous Code sections of the words
"unless otherwise agreed" by providing that their absence does not
imply that the effect of other provisions may not be varied by agree-
ment under subsection (3) of the same section. Section 1-102 (5) merely
refers to construction matters of number and gender. Section 1-104
states a construction against implicit repeal of any part of the Code.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has observed or held, in numerous cases,
that repeals by implication are not favored. Illustrative are Thompson
v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 169 Neb. 377, 99 N.W.2d 761 (1959);
Steeves v. Nispel, 132 Neb. 597, 273 N.W. 50 (1937); and Uttley v.
Sievers, 100 Neb. 59, 158 N.W. 373 (1916). The other sections are noted
in subsequent text.
15 U.C.C. § 1-108. In State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173 Neb.
195, 210, 113 N.W.2d 63, 72 (1962), the court gave full effect to a
severability clause as an expression of legislative intent.
16U.C.C. § 1-201, some of whose definitions are examined in subsequent
text. See notes 27 through 48 infra and accompanying text.
17 U.C.C. §§ 1-101, 1-102 (2).
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of a similar command in the Uniform Sales Act by the Nebraska
Supreme Court in International Milling Co. v. North Platte Flour
Mills, Inc.,'8 the practitioner can be fairly certain that the decisions
of courts of last resort of other Code jurisdictions now on the books 0
will be followed in Nebraska.
Among the rules of construction are the admonition that con-
struction of the Code is to be liberal" and that the administration
of remedies provided by the Code is to be liberal.21
An initial inquiry with respect to almost every statute is to
what extent its provisions may be varied by agreement. One would
expect to find, and does find, the answer in Article 1-in section
1-102 (3), to be specific. This subsection provides that the effect of
Code provisions may be varied by agreement 22 (1) except as other-
wise provided in the Code2 and (2) except that the obligations of
good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by the
Code may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may
determine by agreement reasonable standards by which the per-
18 119 Neb. 325, 328-29, 334, 229 N.W. 22, 23-24, 26 (1930). The court fol-
lowed § 74 of the Uniform Sales Act (USA) in an exemplary manner.
19 At the date of this writing decisions of state courts of last resort under
the Code exist only in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Massachusetts and
Rhode Island. These cases are surprisingly few in number. Indeed,
except for the reporting of decisions of courts of original jurisdiction
in Pennsylvania, the reported cases would be relatively few. In addition
to state trial court decisions, even decisions of referees in bankruptcy
in Pennsylvania, not reported in Federal Supplement except when
adopted by the reviewing judge as the opinion of the court, are reported
in some of the state County Reports. For example, the frequently cited
case, In re Newkirk Mining Co., 54 Berks Cy. L. J. 179 (1962), is a well
known, unreviewed opinion of Referee Russell Hiller constituting a
final decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.
20 U.C.C. § 1-102 (1).
21 U.C.C. § 1-106. The section also provides that "neither consequential or
special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided
in this Act, or by other rule of law."
22 In International Milling Co. v. North Platte Flour Mills, Inc., 119 Neb.
325, 229 N.W. 22 (1930), the court upheld a stipulated damage provision
in an action for the breach of a contract for the sale of flour in reliance
upon USA § 71, which permitted the parties to negative or vary by
express agreement (or by a course of dealing or custom) any writing,
duty or liability arising under a contract to sell or a sale by implication
of law.
2 3 Limitations upon the power to vary include §§ 1-105 (2), 1-208, 2-210 (2),
2-302, 2-318, 2-718, 2-719(3), 4-103, 5-116(2), 9-318(4), 9-501(3).
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formance of such obligations is to be measured. Further, when the
Code requires action to be taken in a reasonable time, any time not
manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.2
Another section 25 establishes the Code as a "displacing" statute.
Principles of law and equity supplement the Code provisions and
apply to the transaction "unless displaced by" its "particular pro-
visions."
The shortest section in the Code 26 makes section captions a part
of the Code. Although this provision is somewhat novel, the Ne-
braska court has recognized that captions may be part of a statute.
27
Of key importance are the general definitions contained in
section 1-201. Of these forty-six definitions, set forth in as many
subsections, twenty-one are derived from prior uniform commercial
acts2 8 and to that extent continue prior Nebraska statutory law.
The remaining twenty-five definitions are new. Some of these
definitions, although contained in the general section, are primarily
concerned with one, two or perhaps three articles and are con-
sidered in subsequent articles of this symposium dealing with the
Article to which they primarily relate-e.g., bill of lading,29 docu-
24 U.C.C. § 1-204(1).
25 U.C.C. § 1-103.
26 U.C.C. § 1-109.
27 Security State Bank v. Aetna Ins. Co., 106 Neb. 126, 183 N.W. 92 (1921)
(dictum).
28 The seven prior uniform commercial acts were the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law (NIL), Uniform Sales Act (USA), Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act (UWRA), Uniform Bills of Lading Act (UBLA), Uniform
Stock Transfer Act (USTA), Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA),
and Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA). All of these but the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act were adopted
in Nebraska. The twenty-one definitions derived from these prior acts
are the following (with parenthetical reference to the appropriate sub-
section in § 1-201): (1) action, (4) bank, (5) bearer, (6) bill of lading,
(9) buyer in ordinary course of business, (13) defendant, (14) delivery,
(15) document of title, (16) fault, (17) fungible, (19) good faith, (20)
holder, (21) insolvent, (24) money, (30) person, (32) purchase, (33)
purchaser, (37) security interest, (44) value, (45) warehouse receipt
and (46) written. The prior counterparts of these definitions may be
found in NIL § 191, NEB. REv. STAT. § 62-1,191 (Reissue 1958); USA §
76, NEB. REv. STAT. § 69-476 (Reissue 1958); UWRA § 58, NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 88-158 (Reissue 1958); USTA § 22, NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-222 (Reissue
1962); and UTRA § 1, NEB. REv. STAT. § 69-701 (Reissue 1958).
29 U.C.C. § 1-201(6).
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ment of title,30 warehouse receipt,31 all of which are primarily con-
cerned with Article 7; buyer in ordinary course of business, 32 which
is primarily concerned with Articles 2, 7 and 9; holder 33 and
bearer,34 which are primarily concerned with Articles 3, 7 and 8;
and security interest,3 which is the key term in Article 9.
The more important general definitions 3 include "conspicuous,'
"fungible," "notice," "knowledge," "notify" or "give a notice," "re-
ceive a notice," "organization," "person," "send" and "value."
The concept of conspicuousness 37 is that of a term or clause so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate
ought to have noticed it. Certain statutory criteria are provided.
A printed heading in capitals is conspicuous; language in the body
of a form is conspicuous if in larger or other contrasting type or
color. Any term in a telegram is conspicuous. Whether a term or
clause is conspicuous is a question for the court.
The prior concept of fungibility-namely, that of goods or
securities of which any unit is by nature or usage of trade the
equivalent of any other like unit-is extended to include unlike
units that are treated as equivalents by agreement.38
30 U.C.C. § 1-201(15).
31 U.C.C. § 1-201(45).
32 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
33 U.C.C.§ 1-201(20).
34 U.C.C.§ 1-201(5).
35 U.C.C.§ 1-201(37).
36 There is no intention to imply that any of the general definitions are
not important. All are fundamental. The definitions not mentioned
elsewhere in the text are the following (with parenthetical reference
to the appropriate subsection in § 1-201): (2) aggrieved party, (3)
agreement, (7) branch, (8) burden of establishing, (11) contract, (12)
creditor, (18) genuine, (21) honor, (22) insolvency proceedings, (29)
party, (31) presumption, (34) remedy, (35) representative, (36) rights,
(39) signed, (40) surety, (41) telegram, (42) term and (43) un-
authorized.
37U.C.C. § 1-201(10). The concept of conspicuousness finds roots in de-
cisions where the courts have commented upon the fine print in or the
misleading arrangement of forms in ruling against the party who had
prepared them. For example, in Cox v. Greenlease-Lied Motors, 134
Neb. 1, 7, 277 N.W. 819, 822 (1938), the court in upholding a claim of
breach of warranty, noted that a printed statement that the automobile
was "'sold under the standard warranty of the manufacturer and the
purchaser hereby agrees that no other warranties have been expressed
or implied"' was "in finer print than the main part of the contract and
was off to one side from the order."
38 U.C.C. § 1-201 (17).
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The definitions of "notice" and "knowledge" and of giving or
receiving a notice are of fundamental importance throughout the
Code. A person has notice of a fact (a) when he has actual knowl-
edge of it, (b) when he has received a notice or notification of it,
or (c) when from all the facts and circumstances known to him
at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists. A
person knows or has knowledge of a fact when he has "actual
knowledge of it." 39 The terms "notice" and "knowledge" under
the Code thus refer to actual notice, not constructive notice-such
as might be imparted by the filing of a document for public record.
A person notifies or gives a notice or notification to another by
taking such steps as may reasonably be required to inform the
other in ordinary course whether or not the other person actually
comes to know of it or not.40 A person receives a notice or notifica-
tion (a) when it is duly delivered at the place of business through
which the contract was made or at any other place held out by
him as a place for receipt of such communications, (b) in the event
notice or notification cannot be had pursuant to (a), when it is
published at least once in a legal newspaper published in, or of
general circulation in, the county where the transaction has its
situs; or (c) when it comes to his attention.41 The alternative pro-
vision for publication in a legal newspaper is a Nebraska variation
from the official text of the Code.42 Emphasis is at times given
to the giving of notice and at other times to the receipt of notice.4
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an or-
ganization is effective for a particular transaction from the time
when it is brought to the attention of the individual in the organiza-
39 U.C.C. § 1-201 (25).
40 U.C.C. § 1-201 (26), first sentence.
41 Nebraska U.C.C. § 1-201 (26), second sentence.
42 The order of the second sentence of U.C.C. § 1-201 (26) is rearranged and
an additional provision is added in the Nebraska Code. Paragraph (b)
of the Official Text appears as paragraph (a) in the Nebraska Code;
and paragraph (a) of the Official Text as paragraph (c) of the Nebraska
Code. Paragraph (b), respecting notice by newspaper publiction, is an
additional provision not in the Official Text. The reason for the varia-
tion is not clear to the author, but reportedly it was heavily supported
by the Nebraska Press Association.
43 See Official Comment 26 to U.C.C. § 1-201. Compare § 2-201(2) (written
confirmation must be received within a reasonable time) with § 2-207(1)
(written confirmation must be sent within a reasonable time); and §
6-105 (transferee must give notice of the transfer) with § 9-312(3) (b)
(competing secured party financing inventory must have received noti-
fication of a subsequent purchase money security interest).
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tion conducting that transaction and, in any event, from the time
when it would have been brought to his attention if the organiza-
tion had exercised due diligence.44 The definition "organization 45
embraces every conceivable business entity of any kind. The term
"person,' 46 which includes an individual or organization, is demon-
strably all-inclusive.
The term "send"4 7 in connection with any writing or notice
refers to a deposit in the mail or to delivery for transmission by
any other usual means of communication with postage or cost of
transmission provided for and properly addressed. The receipt of
any writing or notice within the time at which it would have ar-
rived if properly sent is given the effect of a proper sending.
The term "value"48 is slightly expanded. Except as otherwise
provided with respect to negotiable instruments and bank collec-
tions, a person gives value for rights if he acquires them (a) in
return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for the ex-
tension of immediately available credit whether or not that credit
is drawn upon, (b) as security for or in total or in partial satisfac-
tion of a preexisting claim, (c) by accepting delivery pursuant
to a preexisting contract for purchase, or (d) in return for any
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. Value is re-
garded as given in situation (c) by the conversion of a contingent
obligation into a fixed one.49
The general definitions apply throughout the Code with two
qualifications: They are (1) subject to additional definitions in
subsequent Articles which apply to specific Articles or Parts
thereof, (2) unless the context otherwise requires.
General Rules Applicable to Code Transactions
In addition to rules of construction, general definitions and the
other technical provisions contained in every comprehensive sta-
tute, Article 1 contains general substantive rules applying to all
transactions encompassed by the Code.
Section 1-105 delineates the territorial application of the Code
and the power of the parties to choose applicable law. Subsection
44 U.C.C. § 1-201(27).
45 U.C.C. § 1-201(30).
46 U.C.C. § 1-201(28).
47 U.C.C. § 1-201(38).
48 U.C.C. § 1-201(44).
49 Official Comment 44 to U.C.C. § 1-201.
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(1) provides that when the transaction bears "a reasonable rela-
tion" to Nebraska and also to another state or nation, the parties
may agree that the law of Nebraska or such other state or nation
shall govern their rights and duties.50 This provision is in accord
with dicta in a prior Nebraska decision.5 1 Limitations upon the
power of the parties to stipulate applicable law are set forth in
subsection (2) .52 These limitations primarily involve the rights of
third parties affected by the transaction.5 3 In the absence of express
agreement the Code applies to transactions bearing "an appropriate
relation" to Nebraska.54
By reason of section 1-107 a claim or right arising out of an
alleged breach can be discharged in whole or in part without con-
sideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed and delivered
by an "aggrieved party."55 This section reverses a rule well estab-
lished in Nebraska5 6 and in most, if not all, other common law
jurisdictions.
50This rule is generally recognized and applied. A recent application is
Consolidated Jewelers, Inc. v. Standard Financial Corp., 325 F.2d 31
(6th Cir. 1963). The contract, which had contacts with both Kentucky
and New York, provided that New York law was to govern. The court
enforced this choice. On the other hand, where the transaction has no
apparent relation whatever to the jurisdiction whose law is chosen,
the choice has been disregarded. Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows
Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 Ati. 158 (1937).
51 In Farm Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Beale, 113 Neb. 293, 295-96, 202 N.W.
877, 878 (1925), the court observed in dicta, "Where two or more
parties, residing in different states, enter into a contract, it is competent
for them to select the laws of either state to govern their contract."
52 The limitations are with respect to (1) rights of creditors against sold
goods (§ 2-402), (2) applicability of Article 4 (§ 4-102), (3) bulk
transfers subject to Article 6 (§ 6-102), (4) applicability of Article 8
(§ 8-106), and (5) policy and scope of Article 9 (§§ 9-102 and 9-103).
53 See Industrial Packaging Products Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc.,
399 Pa. 643, 647, 161 A.2d 19, 21 (1960).
54The Massachusetts court followed this provision in applying the
Massachusetts Code to a transaction having nexuses in both Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut where the law of neither state had been
selected by the parties. Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., 187
N.E.2d 669 (Mass. 1963).
55 U.C.C. § 1-201(2).
56The rule established by § 1-107 is clearly contrary to the holdings in
Selig v. Wunderlich Contracting Co., 160 Neb. 215, 69 N.W.2d 861 (1955),
withdrawing on rehearing 159 Neb. 46, 65 N.W.2d 233 (1954), and
Swanson v. Madsen, 145 Neb. 815, 18 N.W.2d 217 (1945). It is also con-
trary to the observation made in Grimes v. Baker, 133 Neb. 517, 523,
275 N.W. 860, 863 (1937).
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An important change in the law of evidence in commercial
litigation is wrought by section 1-202, which makes third party
documents prima facie evidence. A document in due form purport-
ing to be a bill of lading, a policy or certificate of insurance, an
official weigher's or inspector's certificate, a consular invoice or
any other document authorized or required by the contract in
question to be issued by a third party is prima facie evidence of its
own authenticity and genuineness and of the facts stated in the
document by the third party. Under present Nebraska law an
authenticating witness would be necessary to qualify the document
for admission.57 Of course, a party against whom a document in a
Code transaction is introduced in evidence by reason of this section
may introduce evidence tending to establish that the third party
document is not what it purports to be or is not authentic in some
respect, i.e., it is altered. In most cases, of course, the document
will be authentic; and to the extent this Code provision permits its
introduction without the necessity of an authenticating witness, it
reduces the expense of commercial litigation.
The obligation of good faith in performance or enforcement
of every contract or duty within the scope of the Code is imposed
by section 1-203. In addition, under Article 258 a merchant's duty
of good faith means "honesty in fact and observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
What is reasonable and seasonable with respect to time is
established by section 1-204. A reasonable time for taking any
action depends upon the nature, purpose and circumstances of the
action.59 An action is taken "seasonably" when it is taken at or
within the agreed time or, if no time is agreed, at or within a
reasonable time.60
Section 1-205 defines a course of dealing and usage of trade,
provides that they supplement the terms of the agreement within
described limitations and establishes rules of construction. A course
of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties
to a particular transaction fairly to be regarded as establishing a
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions
57 See Imhoff v. Richards, 48 Neb. 590, 596, 67 N.W. 483, 485 (1896) (proper
foundation must be laid for introduction of memorandums); NEB. Ray.
STAT. § 25-12,109 (Reissue 1956) (record of act, condition or event is
competent evidence if custodian testifies to its identity and mode of
preparation).
5 U.C.C.§ 2-104(1) (b).
59 U.C.C. § 1-204(2). Accord, Ansbacher-Siegle Corp. v. Miller Chem. Co.,
137 Neb. 142, 288 N.W. 538 (1939).
60 U.C.C. § 1-204(3).
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and other conduct in the transaction in question.61 It is distinguished
from a course of performance under the contract (or transaction)
in question.62 The term "usage of trade," used but not defined in
the Uniform Sales Act,63 refers to a practice or method of dealing
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade
as to justify the expectation that it will be observed with respect to
the transaction in question.64 The existence and scope of the usage
are to be established as facts. The express terms of an agreement
and an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade are to be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
in the event of conflict, express terms control both course of deal-
ing and usage of trade, and course of dealing prevails over usage
of trade. 5 An applicable usage of trade in the locality of part of
the performance is used in interpreting the agreement as to that
part.66 The section also establishes a procedural requirement in
commercial litigation in that evidence of a relevant usage of trade
offered by one party is inadmissible unless he has given the other
party fair advance notice thereof.67 This important section both
continues and supplements prior Nebraska law.68
A residual statute of frauds is contained in section 1-206. It
covers all kinds of personal property not covered elsewhere. How-
ever, because of the virtually complete coverage of the subject
matter by sections 2-201 (goods), 8-319 (investment securities) and
9-203 (secured transactions), section 1-206 will probably have only
infrequent application.
By reason of section 1-207 performance of duties or an ac-
ceptance of performance may be done under a reservation of rights
by a party who, with explicit reservation of rights, performs or
61 U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
62 U.C.C. § 2-208. See Official Comment 2 to § 1-205.
63 The term is used in USA §§ 15(5), 18(2) and 44(4). However, Uniform
Sales Act § 71 employs the term "custom."
64 U.C.C. § 1-205 (2).
65 U.C.C. § 1-205 (4). In accord as to express terms controlling usage of
trade (custom) is James Poultry Co. v. Nebraska City, 135 Neb. 787,
284 N.W. 273 (1939), rehearing denied and opinion supplemented 136
Neb. 456, 286 N.W. 337 (1939).
66 U.C.C. § 1-205 (5).
67 U.C.C. § 1-205(6).
68 The rules stated in the section are in accord with Frankel v. Pitlor,
166 Neb. 219, 88 N.W.2d 770 (1958); Andrews v. Dehner, 147 Neb. 641,
24 N.W.2d 649 (1946); and James Poultry Co. v. Nebraska City, 135 Neb.
787, 284 N.W. 273 (1939), rehearing denied and opinion supplemented,
136 Neb. 456, 286 N.W. 337 (1939).
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promises performance or assents to performance in a manner de-
manded or offered by the other party. Words like "without pre-
judice" or "under protest" are statutory examples of sufficiency.
Finally, in section 1-208, Article 1 deals in general terms with
the "insecurity clause," which is frequently found in promissory
notes, security agreements and the like. A term that one party
may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral or
additional collateral "at will" or "when he deems himself insecure"
means that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith
believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired.
This provision embodies the rule followed in pre-Code Nebraska
decisions.69 However, the burden of establishing a lack of good faith
is upon the party against whom the power has been exercised.
ARTICLE 2
SALES
Article 2 replaces the Uniform Sales Act, adopted in Nebraska
in 1921.70 The Sales Act, as it is frequently referred to, was promul-
gated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law in 1906. The law which it codified was of an earlier
period.7' Article 2 modernizes the Sales Act-i.e., it brings sales
law into tune with- present commercial practices and standards
and, in the process, expands the content of the Sales Act by more
than one half.7 2
69Flinn v. Fredrickson, 89 Neb. 563, 131 N.W. 934 (1911); NewLean &
'Hoard v. Olson, 22 Neb. 717, 36 N.W. 155 (1888). In Flinn v. Fredrickson,
supra, 89 Neb. at 566, 131 N.W. at 935, the court commented: "When
he saw the automobile rolling out of his garage with plaintiff in pos-
session,- he suddenly felt 'unsafe and insecure,' and rushed out, com-
mitted an assault, and took the property. The insecurity clause was
never intended to serve such an unreasonable and arbitrary purpose.
There must be a cause for feeling insecure."
70NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 69-401 to 69-478 (Reissue 1950). Hereinafter, statu-
tory references will be only to the pertinent section of the Uniform Sales
Act-e.g., USA § 76.
71See State of New. Jersey Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 19
(1960). Professor William D. Hawkland, now Dean of the Buffalo
School of Law, was the Director of the New Jersey Study and the author
of, among other Articles, the comments, on Article 2.
72 The Uniform Sales Act contains seventy-nine sections. Of these, fourteen
(§§ 27 through 40) pertain to documents of title. These sections are
assimilated along with corresponding sections of the Uniform Bills of
Lading Act (UBLA) and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (UWRA)
in Article 7. Article 2 thus expands the sixty-four sections of the Uni-
form Sales Act (USA) into 104.
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Article 2 proceeds from the premise that sales are laymen's
transactions73 and that sales contracts which businessmen reason-
ably believe they have made with each other should be enforced
irrespective of technical common law approaches. While Article 2
is primarily a change of approach or emphasis, it does make some
important changes in the law, particularly in the area of contract
formation-i.e., offer and acceptance, statute of frauds and con-
sideration. For the most part, however, Article 2 will be principally
a continuation of and supplement to existing Nebraska statutory
sales law.
Perhaps the most remarkable fact, apparent to one leafing
through the pages of the Code, is the length of Article 2. It con-
stitutes more than a quarter of the Code-both from the standpoint
of number of sections and of textual content. Article 2 is divided
into seven parts: (1) general construction and subject matter; (2)
form, formation and readjustment of contract; (3) general obliga-
tion and construction of contract; (4) title, creditors and good faith
purchasers; (5) performance; (6) breach, repudiation and excuse;
(7) remedies.
This organization seems logical and will be followed by the
writer in the ensuing discussion. This article can, because of
space limitations, consider only the areas of relative importance,
while calling attention to other areas. In its course, the article
will note most of the more important changes from pre-Code
Nebraska law.74
(1) GENERAL CONSTRUCTION AND SUBJECT MATTER
Article 2 applies to transactions in goods.7 5 It does not apply
to investment securities, which are governed by Article 8, or
secured transactions which are governed by Article 9. Article 2
does not repeal or in any wise impair any statute regulating sales
to consumers, or any other statute regulating sales to farmers or
other designated classes of buyers.76
73Weeks, Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2--Sales, 50 ILL. B.J. 494(1962); Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales
and Bulk Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 CORNELL
L.Q. 1, 2 (1962); see Official Comment to U.C.C. § 2-101.
74 The writer cannot, and does not intend within these space limitations
to deal exhaustively with all changes in Nebraska sales law. The im-
portant changes, of which the practitioner should be mindful, are dis-
cussed.
75 U.C.C. § 2-102.
78 U.C.C. § 2-102.
NEBRASKA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Definitions
Part 1 of Article 2 supplies definitions applicable to Article
2 .77 In addition to the fundamental ones of buyer and seller, the
terms "goods," "future goods," "sales of part interest," "contract
for sale," and "sale" are defined substantially as they were in the
Sales Act with one exception78 "Future goods" under the Sales
Act were goods manufactured or acquired by the seller after the
making of a contract.79 Under the Code goods are "future goods"
even though the seller may have them in stock at the time of the
contract if they are not "identified. 8 0
An important innovation of the Code is its distinction between
merchant and non-merchant. Merchant is defined as a person who
deals in goods of a kind, or otherwise by his occupation holds him-
self out as having a knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction; or to whom such knowledge
or skill may be attributed by his employment of one holding him-
self out as possessing that knowledge or skill.8s The special provi-
sions regarding merchants are confined to Article 2. They are of
three kinds: (1) those dealing with problems of contract forma-
tion and contract content, which rest on normal business practices
and procedures; (2) those dealing with warranties, such as the
warranty of merchantability, which is implied only "if the seller
is a merchant with goods of that kind;" and (3) those sections
applying to persons who are merchants either under the "practices"
or the "goods" aspect of the definition of merchant.82 The term
77 These definitions are, of course, supplemental to the general definitions
continued in U.C.C. § 1-201.
78 These terms are defined in U.C.C. §§ 2-105 and 2-106. They were defined
in USA §§ 1, 6 and 76.
79USA § 76(1).
8o U.C.C. § 2-105 (2). The term "identified" is defined in U.C.C. § 2-501.
81 U.C.C. § 2-104(1). The Code concept of a merchant seems to be in line
with the observation concerning the parties made by the court in
Richardson v. Waterite Co., 169 Neb. 263, 271, 99 N.W. 2d 265, 272 (1959):
"It must be noted that both Perkins and Waterite had been engaged
in the manufacture and sale of vacuum diatomite filters for swimming-
pool use before the contract was entered into. Perkins was an expert
in the field and Waterite also had capable engineers and water-filter
experts among its officers and employees. Waterite was thoroughly
familiar with the design, construction, and function of the Perkins filter,
it having manufactured and sold a limited number of such filters before
it entered into the contract."82 Official Comment 2 to § 2-104. The practitioner dealing with any part
of the Code should be familiar with the Official Comments. They pro-
vide valuable, if not indispensable, interpretative background.
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"between merchants" is one which applies to a transaction with
respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge
or skill of "merchants."8 3
The term "receipt of goods," meaning "taking physical posses-
sion of the goods," is a new one.84 It is important in the instances,
among others, of the buyer's obligation to pay for the goods and
of risk of loss in the case of a merchant-seller.85
Additional definitions include "financing agency," which in-
cludes a bank or other person who by arrangement with either
party intervenes in the normal course of commerce between per-
sons who are in the position of buyer and seller with respect to
the goods;86 "lot," a new definition, meaning a single article which
is the subject matter of a separate sale or delivery, whether or not
sufficient to perform the contract; 87 "commercial unit," also a new
definition, meaning a unit of goods which by commercial usage is
a single whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially
impairs its value on the market or in use;88 and "termination" and
"cancellation," the former of which occurs pursuant to a power
created by agreement otherwise than for breach, and the latter of
which occurs when either party ends a contract for a breach by
the other.89
Goods Severed From Realty
Article 2 also covers the subject of goods to be severed from
the realty-e.g., timber, minerals or the like, or a structure or its
materials. A contract for the sale of one of these is a contract for
the sale of goods within Article 2 if they are to be severed by the
83 U.C.C. § 2-104(3).
84 U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (c).
8 5 Under U.C.C. § 2-310 (a) payment is due at the time and place at which
the buyer is to receive the goods even though the place of shipment is
the place of delivery. Thus under an 'T.O.B. point of origin" term, the
place of shipment usually is the place of delivery, but the buyer's
obligation to pay is at the point of destination, where he is to receive
the goods. This affords the buyer his preliminary right of inspection.
See Official Comment 1 to § 2-310. Under § 2-509(3) the risk of loss is
upon a merchant seller until the buyer receives the goods.
86 U.C.C. § 2-104(2).
87 U.C.C. § 2-105 (5).
88U.C.C. § 2-105(6). Illustrations of commercial units are given-e.g.,
a single article (as a machine); a set of articles (as a suite of furniture
or an assortment of sizes); a quantity (as a bale, gross or carload);
or any other unit treated in use or in the relevant market as a unitary
whole.
89 U.C.C. §§ 2-106 (3), (4).
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seller. However, until severance, a purported present sale thereof,
which is not effective as a transfer of an interest in land, is effective
only as a contract to sell.90 If the buyer is to sever, however, the
contract is considered as one affecting the real estate, and all the
rules applicable thereto govern. In the case of crops or other things
attached to the realty and capable of severance without material
harm thereto, however, the contract is one for the sale of goods
within Article 2 whether severance is to be effected by the buyer
or the seller, even though it forms part of the realty at the time
of contracting.91 The provisions of the Code section covering sales
of items attached to the realty are subject to rights of any third
party provided by the law relating to realty records. If a written
contract for sale is executed, it may be recorded as a document
transferring an interest in land and from that point on constitutes
notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract for
sale.92
(2) FoRMA, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF CONTRACT
The greatest change in the law of sales under the Code is
contained in the area of contract formation-an area which the
Uniform Sales Act did not occupy, but rather left to the common
law. Article 2 reverses several of the more technical common law
rules of contract formation because they are not in tune with the
current practices of businessmen.
A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of a contract.93 Also an agreement
sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even
90 The rule is recognized in Nebraska that the removal of minerals is the
removal of a component part of real estate itself. While the severance
changes the character of the property, it remains real estate until
detached. Fawn Lake Ranch Co. v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75
(1918).
91 The parties can by identification effect a present sale thereof before
severance. This appears to be in accord with pre-Code Nebraska de-
cisional law, which treats annual crops growing on land as personalty.
Miles v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 136 Neb. 46, 285 N.W. 90 (1939).92 This section will supplement other Nebraska statutes dealing with the
recording of contracts affecting timber, minerals and the like. See,
e.g., NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 57-208 (Reissue 1960), which deals with recording
of oil, mineral or gas leases.
93 U.C.C. § 2-204(1). This rule is followed or recognized in Nebraska
decisions. See, e.g., Bendfeldt v. Lewis, 149 Neb. 107, 30 N.W.2d 293
(1948); Citizens State Bank v. State Bank of Oelrichs, 111 Neb. 571,
197 N.W. 607 (1924).
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though the precise moment of its making cannot be determined.9 4
A contract does not fail for indefiniteness even though one or more
terms are left open, provided the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an ap-
propriate remedy 5
Offer-Acceptance
Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances, an offer to make a contract is construed as inviting
an acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in
the circumstances.9 6 As before the Code, the offeror can still
specify the means of acceptance.97 If he does, his intention is clearly,
not ambiguously, evidenced.
Occasionally an offer may request performance from an offeree
as a mode of acceptance. Circumstances may be such that the
offeror will not know of the offeree's commencement of per-
formance and, therefore, his acceptance. Under the Code an offeror
in this situation who is not notified of acceptance within a reason-
able time may treat the offer as having lapsed.9 8
94U.C.C. § 2-204(2). This may occur where an offer is accepted by an
act or acts of the offeree.
95U.C.C. § 2-204(3). The rule of this subsection was stated and applied
in Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Iowa Fruit & Produce Co., 112 F.2d 101
(8th Cir. 1940), which held that a contract of sales agency (rather
than one of sale) was not void for indefiniteness by reason of the
absence of a definite quantity in the contract.
90U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (a). Thus, as observed in Anderson v. Stewart, 149
Neb. 660, 32 N.W.2d 140 (1948), an offer by mail implies authority to
communicate the acceptance by mail. Under the Code an acceptance
by telegram would also be sufficient.
Paragraph (b) of § 2-206(1) deals with a situation of an order or
offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment. The offer is con-
strued as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by
the prompt shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods. However,
a shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute an acceptance
if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered
only as an accommodation. Otherwise, the shipment of non-conforming
goods constitutes both an acceptance and a breach.
97 The Code in no way impinges upon the freedom of the offeror with
respect to the conditioning of his offer as recognized in Kline v.
Metcalfe Constr. Co., 148 Neb. 357, 361-62, 27 N.W.2d 383, 386 (1947).
98U.C.C. § 2-206(2). In Standard Oil Co. v. O'Hare, 126 Neb. 11, 252 N.W.
398 (1934), the court noted the distinction with respect to communica-
tion of acceptance as between offers that ask that the offeree do some-
thing and those that ask that he promise something, observing that
communication was necessary in the latter instance. The Code obliter-
ates the distinction to the extent indicated.
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Acceptance Containing Additional or Different Terms
A key section of Article 2 deals with the subjects both of
contract formation and of contract content where the parties ex-
change forms containing additional or conflicting terms.0 9 A "defi-
nite and seasonable expression of acceptance" operates as an ac-
ceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered, unless acceptance is "expressly made conditional"
on assent to the additional or different terms. Prior Nebraska com-
mon law,100 as well as the prior common law of most, if not all,
English common law jurisdictions, is changed by this key Code sec-
tion. Under prior common law an acceptance repeating the terms of
an offer was required to match those terms precisely.10 '
The Code thus treats an acceptance merely containing addi-
tional or different terms as an ambiguous acceptance and visits the
consequences of the ambiguity upon the offeree by holding him to
an acceptance. The offeree, of course, removes the ambiguity where
he expressly conditions the acceptance by saying, for example, "I
accept the offer upon the express condition that you agree to the
following additional [or substitutel terms." An acceptance of this
tenor is the Code's counter-offer, which in turn requires an ac-
ceptance for formation of a contract.
Having answered the question of contract formation, section
2-207 next answers the question of contract content. As between
non-merchants, the additional terms never become part of the
contract unless and until the recipient of the acceptance agrees
to them. As between merchants, however, the additional terms
may become part of the contract by a mere failure to object to
them within a reasonable time after receipt of the acceptance. The
additional terms do not become part of the contract in any of the
following three situations: (a) if the offer expressly limited ac-
ceptance to the terms of the offer, (b) if the additional terms
99 U.C.C. § 2-207. This is one of the problems dealt with by the section. The
section is not confined to printed form offers (or orders), acceptances
and confirmations.
100 The Nebraska rule of general contract law is evidenced by statements
in the following decisions: Frankel v. Pitlor, 166 Neb. 219, 88 N.W.2d
770 (1958); Anderson v. Stewart, 149 Neb. 660, 32 N.W.2d 140 (1948);
Kline v. Metcalfe Constr. Co., 148 Neb. 357, 27 N.W.2d 383 (1947).
101 This rule has been referred to as the "mirror image", apparently upon
the notion that the acceptance was required to rule the terms of the
offer precisely. See Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways
in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code,
48 ComRNii L. Q. 1, 44 (1962).
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would materially alter the contract so formed, and (c) if notice
of objection has already been given to them or is given to them
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. The
"different" term in the acceptance does not become part of the
contract.
0 2
Written Confirmations
In addition to the offer-acceptance situation, section 2-207
also covers the written confirmation situation. The written con-
firmation situation is one in which the parties have made a verbal
agreement, generally one within the statute of frauds, and ex-
changed confirmations reciting the terms of the verbal agreement. 10 3
Confirmations (whether on printed forms or not) frequently con-
tain terms additional to those discussed in the conversation result-
ing in the verbal agreement. The problem here is primarily one
of contract content, not contract formation (except as "formation"
is used in the sense of "validation"). The recipient of the confirma-
tion must, like the recipient of the acceptance containing additional
terms, object within a reasonable time after notice of the additional
terms is received. The additional terms in the confirmation (i.e., the
terms not discussed in the conversation resulting in the verbal
agreement) that differ (i.e., conflict) presumably cancel each other,
since each seems notice of objection to the other's term. The term
"acceptance" is also used with respect to the written confirmation,
but it seems clear that "acceptance" in this connection refers to
formation in the sense of validation.1°4 The written confirmation
must be sent within a reasonable time after the verbal agreement.10 5
Finally, section 2-207 specifically covers the situation where
the parties may exchange forms (offer and acceptance or con-
10 2 The word "different" is omitted from subsection (2) of § 2-207, un-
doubtedly for the reason that the presence of a conflicting term in the
offer constitutes a prior notice of objection under (2) (c). See Official
Comment 6 to § 2-207.
103 An illustration of crossing written confirmations is found in Morris
Asinof & Sons v. Freudenthal, 195 App. Div. 79, 85, 186 N.Y. Supp.
383, 387 (1921), affd, 233 N.Y. 564, 135 N.E. 919 (1922).
104 See In the Matter of Doughboy Indus., Inc., and Pantasote Co., 17 App.
Div. 2d 216, 219, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1962).
105U.C.C. § 2-207(1). For purposes of the statute of frauds, § 2-201(2), the
confirmation must also be "received" within a reasonable time. The
terms "receive" and "send" are defined respectively in U.C.C. § 1-201(26)
and (38). Thus, by clear implication a written confirmation sent an un-
reasonable time after the making of the verbal agreement would not be
an "acceptance" under § 2-207 or a "writing" under § 2-201(2).
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firmation) with conflicting terms which neither party bothers to
read until a dispute arises in the course of performance-i.e., after
conduct by both parties recognizing a contract has occurred. In
this case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms
on which the writings on the parties agree, together with any
other supplementary terms incorporated by any other provision
of the Code.1 6
The Code, in section 2-207, provides blanket coverage of the
problems involved in the exchange of offers and acceptances and
confirmations (whether on printed forms or not) which do not
match and thereby attempts to solve many of the knotty problems
which have plagued the courts for years.
Statute of Frauds
The Code statute of frauds, section 2-201, effects several
changes from pre-Code law.
For one thing, it lessens considerably the requirements of
section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act as interpreted in prior Nebraska
decisions-namely, that the memorandum itself contain every es-
sential term of the contract to be enforced.10 7 Section 2-201 requires
only (1) that there be a writing sufficient to demonstrate the
existence of a real transaction; (2) that the writing be signed by
the party against whom it is sought to be enforced or his duly
authorized agent; and (3) that the writing state a quantity. 08 The
omission or misstatement of a term does not render the writing
insufficient except that the contract is not enforceable beyond the
quantity stated in the memorandum.
Also, section 2-201 substitutes the objective term "price?' for
the subjective term "value" in the Uniform Sales Act, although
the amount, 500 dollars, is retained.
An important, and very desirable, change in the law is ef-
fected in section 2-201 (2). As between merchants, 09 if within a
reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and
sufficient against the sender is received and the receiving party
106 U.C.C. § 2-207(3). This includes those terms incorporated under §
2-207(1), (2).
107 Under the Nebraska Uniform Sales Act the memorandum was required
to contain every essential term that was the subject of express agree-
ment. Ord v. Benson, 163 Neb. 367, 370, 79 N.W.2d 713, 715 (1956).
10 8 The quantity term is the heart of the sales contract under the Code.
See notes 120 and 121 infra and accompanying text.
10 9 See note 81 supra.
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has reason to know its contents, the writing satisfies the require-
ments of a memorandum under subsection (1) against the recipient
unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within
ten (10) days after its receipt. 110 In theory the only effect of the
failure of the recipient to object to the writing is that he is deprived
of the right to plead the statute of frauds in defense. He can still
deny the making of the contract; and if he does, the sender of the
written confirmation must still satisfy the trier of fact of the
existence of the contract. If the recipient does object, however,
the sender is forewarned of his intention to plead the statute of
frauds and can thereby avoid the expense of performance.
Exceptions to the requirement of the statute of frauds are
likewise established. The exception in favor of specially manufac-
tured goods contained in the Sales Act is continued with modifica-
tions. The statute of frauds is also unavailable if the defendant
admits the making of the contract in a pleading or in testimony, but
only to the extent of the quantity admitted. The final exception
represents a substantial change in the law, including prior Nebraska
decisional law."' This exception validates part payment or part ac-
ceptance only to the extent thereof. No longer can a part payment or
a part acceptance validate a claim for a larger quantity.1 2
Parol Evidence Rule
The Code also carves out another area previously occupied by
the common law-the parol evidence rule in contracts of sale. The
Code's rule, contained in section 2-202, is an inversion of the rule
commonly stated in several Nebraska decisions."13 Terms with
1o The result reached in J. H. Teasdale Comm'n. Co. v. Keckler, 84 Neb.
116, 120 N.W. 955 (1909), a pre-Sales Act case, could be sustained
under the Code. The merchant, who had received two confirmations
(one from the grain broker and one from his principal), made no
objection to them until the time for performance, when he made a
partial shipment only. The partial shipment was held to take the
contract out of the statute of frauds. Absent the written confirmations
the result of the case would be reversed by U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (c).
" See note 110 supra.
112 U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (c). Acceptance or payment as to the part is still
necessary under the Code to validate the contract as to that part, as it
was under the Sales Act. Benes v. Reed, 158 Neb. 128, 62 N.W.2d 320
(1954) (no allegation of payment or acceptance of cornpicker).
13 The rule is typified by decisions of the tenor of Glass v. Nebraska
State Bank, 175 Neb. 673, 122 N.W.2d 882 (1963), involving a dispute
between a bank and its customer. Under the rule stated in Nebraska
decisions, of which this recent one is typical, the presumption that the
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respect to which the writings of the parties agree or which are
otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement may not, with respect to the terms
that are included therein, be contradicted by evidence of any prior
or contemporaneous oral agreement. These terms may, however,
be explained or supplemented by a course of dealing, a usage of
trade or a course of performance and also by evidence of consistent
additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been
intended as a "complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement."
Seats-Effect
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a contract for
sale or an offer to buy or sell goods does not constitute the writing
a sealed instrument for purposes of the law dealing with sealed
instruments." 4
Consideration-Removal of Its Necessity in Two Instances
The Code also launches attacks upon the doctrine of considera-
tion in two important situations in which the practice of the busi-
ness world runs contrary to the course of the common law. The
first is the situation of a "firm offer" by a merchant.115 An offer
by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable for
lack of consideration during the stated time or if no time is stated,
within a reasonable time. In no event may the period of irrevocabil-
ity exceed three months. 116 The second situation is that of an
whole agreement of the parties was included in the writing is made
to depend upon an inspection of the writing. Under § 2-202 it depends
upon other circumstances as well, and the writing may be supple-
mented by consistent additional terms unless the court finds that the
parties intended the writing as a complete and exclusive statement of
the agreement. A "merger clause", - i.e., a recital that there is no
subject matter of agreement not contained in the document-would
be evidence of the parties' intention. See Cox v. Greenlease-Lied Motors,
134 Neb. 1, 277 N.W. 819 (1938). It would not, however, necessarily be
conclusive. Air Conditioning Corp. v. Honaker, 296 Ill. App. 221,
16 N.E.2d 153 (1938).
"14U.C.C. § 2-203.
115 U.C.C. § 2-205. Consideration was required in the case of a "firm offer"
by a merchant before the Code. Poposia Coal Co. v. Nye-Schneider-
Fowler Co., 106 Neb. 4, 182 N.W. 586 (1921); see Moise & Co. v. Rock
Springs Distilling Co., 79 Neb. 124, 112 N.W. 372 (1907).
116 On the facts of Poposia Coal Co. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., supra
note 115, a different result might be reached under § 2-205, since the
firm offer (or firm price list, although the court did not regard it as
such) was accepted within three months.
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agreement modifying a sales contract," 7 an example of which is that
of an agreement reducing the price at which the goods were to be
purchased.
Readjustment of Contract: Modification and Assignment
The final two sections of part 2 are concerned with the subject
of modification of the original sales contracts by (1) a change in
terms of the contract (by modification, rescission or waiver) and
(2) change in parties (through assignment or delegation of per-
formance, where permissible).s118
(3) GENERAL OBLIGATION Am CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT
As stated in section 2-301, the obligation of the seller is to
transfer and deliver the goods and the obligation of the buyer is
to accept and pay for them in accordance with the contract. The
remainder of part 3, which deals with the principal terms of the
sales contract, enlarges these general obligations.
The principal terms" 9 of a contract of sale are the quantity
term, the price term, the delivery term, the payment term and the
warranty term.
Quantity
The quantity term must be supplied by the parties expressly. 20
All other terms can, if necessary, probably be supplied by the
Code. That is not to say that it is desirable for businessmen to
enter into agreements containing only a quantity term, but is to
say that it is conceivable that such an agreement is capable of
enforcement.' 2'
"7 U.C.C. § 2-209(1). The rule under this does not change the rule under
prior Nebraska decisional law as to modifications in the agreement made
before breach, but would change the rule as to modifications made after
breach. Selig v. Wunderlich Contracting Co., 160 Neb. 215, 69 N.W.2d
861 (1955); Moore v. Markel, 112 Neb. 743, 201 N.W. 147 (1924).
118 U.C.C. §9 2-209 and 2-210.
19 '"Term" is defined in § 1-201(42) as "that portion of an agreement which
relates to a particular matter."
120 As previously noted (note 108 supra), the quantity term is the heart
of the sales contract. The quantity is usually stated in terms of a definite
amount or number of units except in the case of a requirements, an
output or an exclusive dealing contract (Q 2-306), where elasticity is
necessarily permissible.
'
21 In the case of an agreement stating only a quantity term it is con-
ceivable that the agreement can be enforced with other provisions of
part 3 supplying the missing terms: e.g., price (Q 2-305), time of de-
livery (§ 2-309), single delivery (§ 2-307), place of delivery (Q 2-308),
payment (§ 2-310), and warranty (Q 2-314).
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Price
As under the Sales Act, the price may be payable in money
or property.12 2 If the price is payable in whole or in part in goods,
each party is the seller of his own goods. A change from prior law
is that the Code applies in transfers involving a sale of goods in
which all or part of the price is payable in an interest in realty.
The Sales Act did not apply at all if the transfer of an interest in
realty constituted the whole or any part of the consideration.12
In accordance with pre-Code Nebraska decisional law,124 the
Code permits a very liberal open price term. 25 If the parties so
intend, they can conclude a contract for sale even though the price
is not settled. In such a case, the price is a reasonable price at the
time for delivery.
Delivery and Shipment
The Code continues, essentially, the provisions of the Sales Act
with respect to delivery. The Code, however, adds substantially
to the Sales Act by its definition of a number of delivery or ship-
ping terms.
Unless it is otherwise agreed, all goods called for by a contract
for sale must be tendered in a single delivery and payment is due
only on such a tender.126 Also, unless otherwise agreed, the place
for delivery of goods is the seller's place of business or, if he has
none, his residence; but in a contract for the sale of identified
goods which, to the knowledge of the parties at the time of contract-
ing, are in some other place, that place is the place for delivery.2 7
A new provision is that documents of title may be delivered through
customary banking channels. 2 8 The time for delivery, if not agreed
upon, and not otherwise provided in Article 2, is a reasonable
time.129
122 U.C.C. § 2-304.
= USA § 9 (3).
124 Seybolt v. Waters, 109 Neb. 99, 189 N.W. 980 (1922) (judgment for buyer
for failure of seller to offer evidence of reasonable price).
125 U.C.C. § 2-305.
126 U.C.C. § 2-307. Where, however, the circumstances give either party the
right to make or demand delivery in lots, the price, if it can be appor-
tioned, may be demanded for each lot.
127 U.C.C. § 2-308 (a) and (b), which restates USA § 43 (1).
128 U.C.C. § 2-308(c), which merely codifies well established commercial
practice.
129 U.C.C. § 2-309.
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Unlike the Uniform Sales Act, the Code, in sections 2-319
through 2-324, comprehensively defines the obligation of each party
under standard delivery or shipping terms: "F.O.B.," 130 "F.A.S.,"'131
"C.I.F., ' 132 "C. & F.,"'13 "net landed weights,"'134 "ex-ship,"'135 and
"no arrival, no sale.""36 Also outlined are the obligations of the
seller with respect to the form of bill of lading required in an
overseas shipment.137 A shipment is "overseas" insofar as by usage
of trade or agreement it is subject to the commercial, financing or
shipping practices characteristic of international deep water com-
merce. 13 8 These terms, except for "F.O.B.," are ones generally as-
sociated with foreign trade and have been the subject of decisional
law principally in the British common law jurisdictions and the
seaboard states. The Code codifies the better decisional law and
commercial understanding with respect to these terms.
Payment
Unless it is otherwise agreed, payment is due at the time and
place at which the buyer is to receive the goods even though the
place of shipment is the place of delivery."39 If delivery is authorized
and is made by documents of title, payment is due at the time and
place at which the buyer is to receive the documents irrespective
of where the goods are to be received.140
Payment may also be effected by means of a letter of credit
term in the contract of sale. The failure of the buyer seasonably
to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach of contract. If a
letter of credit is dishonored, the seller may, on seasonable notifica-
tion to the buyer, require payment directly. The term "letter of
credit" means an irrevocable credit issued by a financing agency
of good repute or of good international repute.'4 '
130 U.C.C. § 2-319.
131 Ibid.
132 U.C.C. § 2-320.
133 Ibid.
14 U.C.C. § 2-321.
135 U.C.C. § 2-322.
136 U.C.C. § 2-324.
137 U.C.C. § 2-323.
138 U.C.C. § 2-323 (3).
1"9 U.C.C. § 2-310 (a).
140 U.C.C. § 2-310 (c).
'41 U.C.C. § 2-325.
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Warranties
The warranties of the Sales Act have been reclassified and
expanded by the Code.
The warranty of title under Uniform Sales Act section 13 is
continued in section 2-312.142 The warranty of quiet possession con-
tained in USA section 13 (2) is abolished, since disturbance of quiet
possession is merely one way of establishing breach of warranty of
title. Novel to the Code warranty of title is the inclusion of one
against claims of infringements in a case of a merchant seller,
unless the buyer furnishes the specifications in which case the
buyer makes the warranty.143
Express warranties are also clarified and broadened. Any af-
firmation of fact or promise which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty under
the Code, 44 while USA section 12 required the factors of induce-
ment and reliance. Descriptions of goods and samples or models
which are made part of the basis of the bargain create express war-
ranties under the Code.145 Under the Sales Act they created only im-
plied warranties. 4 A clarification is that a sample which is made
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
"whole" of the goods (rather than the "bulk" of the goods) will
conform to the sample. 47 As under prior Nebraska law,'
1 4 it is
142Under U.C.C. § 2-312 it makes no difference whether or not the seller
was in possession of the goods at the time the contract to sell was made.
See Official Comment 1 to § 2-312. While there were apparently no
decisions on the subject under the Nebraska Uniform Sales Act, a
pre-Sales Act decision appears to emphasize possession as a requisite
for implication of the warranty. Hall v. Aitkin, 25 Neb. 360, 41 N.W.
192 (1889) (seller in possession held liable on implied warranty).
143 U.C.C. § 2-312 (3).
144 U.C.C. § 2-313 (1) (a). In Garbark v. Newman, 155 Neb. 188, 51 N.W.2d
315 (1952), the statement by a seller of a used car that the cylinder
block had not been cracked was held an express warranty under the
Sales Act.
145 U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (b). In the case of a sale by sample the rule stated
in this subsection appears in accord with a pre-Sales Act Nebraska
decision. In Crawford v. E. B. Weeks Seed Co., 110 Neb. 196, 198, 193
N.W. 271, 272 (1923), the court stated, 'The general rule of law is that
a sale by sample expresses or implies a warranty or condition that the
bulk corresponds in kind and quality to the sample."
146 USA § 14.
147 This avoids the interpretative problem in connection with the term
"bulk". In F.A.D. Andrea, Inc. v. Dodge, 15 F.2d 1003 (3d Cir. 1926), the
court construed the term in USA §§ 14 and 16 to mean all the goods,
not just a very large percentage.
148 U.C.C. § 2-312(2); Patrick v. Leach, 8 Neb. 530, 1 N.W. 853 (1879).
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not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty. However, as was also the case under
prior Nebraska law,149 an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
The implied warranty of merchantability is considerably clari-
fied under the Code. Criteria as to merchantability, established in
section 2-314(2), include (1) passing without objection in the trade
under the contract description, (2) fitness for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used, and (3) in the case of fungible
goods, quality of fair average within the description. 150 As under
the Sales Act, the warranty is implied only in the case of a mer-
chant "dealing in goods of that kind."'151 A codification of pre-
Code decisional law is that the serving for value of food or drink,
whether consumed on the premises or elsewhere, is a sale. 52
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is con-
tinued in section 2-315 with noteworthy changes. Under section
2-315 the warranty is made where the seller at the time of con-
tracting "has reason to know" of a particular purpose for which
149 Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc. 165 Neb. 138, 154, 84 N.W.2d 151, 161(1957); Ralston Purina Co. v. fiams, 143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d 452 (1943).
In Cooper v. Marr, 149 Neb. 211, 30 N.W.2d 563 (1948), the court held
that a false statement by the seller as to the price which she had paid
for goods sold to the buyer was not actionable since it was not material
and did not mislead the buyer.
150In §§ 2-314 and 2-315 the Code distinguishes between fitness for an
ordinary purpose and fitness for a particular purpose. Fitness for an
ordinary purpose is one aspect of the warranty of merchantability. The
warranty involved with respect to the tractor used in the performance
of normal farming tasks in Springer v. Henthorn, 169 Neb. 578, 100
N.W.2d 521 (1960), would thus be the warranty of merchantability
rather than warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. See Official
Comment 2 to § 2-315.
As to the aspect of quality, the Code warranty of merchantability
is in accord with prior Nebraska law. In Adolph Goldmark & Sons v.
Simon Bros. Co., 110 Neb. 614, 194 N.W. 686 (1923), an action for a
breach of contract for the sale of a carload of Madagascar lima beans,
the court upheld an instruction to a jury that the term "merchantable"
does not require that the article sold shall be of first quality but means
only that the article shall be vendible in the market in the ordinary
course of business and at the average price of such an article.
151 USA § 15 (2) ("goods of that description").
152 U.C.C. § 2-314(1); Zorinsky v. The American Legion Omaha Post No. 1,
163 Neb. 212, 79 N.W.2d 172 (1956) (piece of glass concealed in sherbet
injured mouth of patron).
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the goods are required and that the buyer is relying upon the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. Under
the Sales Act the seller impliedly warranted fitness for a particular
purpose if a buyer either expressly or by implication made known
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods were
required and it appeared that the buyer relied on the seller's skill
or judgment.15 3 Also, the Code eliminates the exception with
respect to goods sold "by a patent or other trade name." Under
section 2-315 the existence of a patent or other trade name is only
one of several facts to be considered on the question of whether
the buyer actually relied upon the seller,154 a result probably not
far different from that reached in a prior Nebraska decision. 55
A seller's warranty, whether express or implied, extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of the buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use or be affected by the goods or who is injured in
person by the breach of warranty.5 G Nebraska decisional law has
already transcended this point of development. 57
For the first time in statutory law, the Code covers explicitly
the subjects of exclusion or modification of warranties and con-
struction of warranties in the case of cumulation or conflict.'5 s
New requisites for the effectiveness of disclaimers of implied war-
ranties are established.15 9 In order to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability, or any part of it, the language,
whether written or oral, must mention merchantability; and if the
language is written, the writing must be conspicuous. 60 An exclu-
153 USA § 15 (1).
154 See Official Comment 5 to § 2-315.
155 Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc. 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
156 U.C.C. § 2-318.
157 In Asher v. Cocal Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961),
the court held that a bottler was liable directly to the consumer, not-
withstanding want of privity, for damages for ill effects suffered by a
consumer in finding a dead mouse in a coke bottle. Section 2-318 in
no way affects any remedy the consumer may have on a negligence
theory. Cases like Colvin v. John Powell & Co., 163 Neb. 112, 77 N.W.2d
900 (1956), would thus be unaffected.
158 U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-317.
159 U.C.C. § 2-316 (2).
160 Thus, the disclaimer of warranty as to the productiveness of seed corn
held effective against the buyer in Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co.,
146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d 51 (1945), would probably require revision to
meet the requirements of § 2-316 (2).
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sion or modification of an implied warranty of fitness can be
accomplished only by a conspicuous writing. Notwithstanding these
requirements, unless circumstances otherwise indicate, all implied
warranties are excluded by (1) expressions like "as is," or "with
all faults," (2) an examination of the goods by the buyer (or an
opportunity to examine the goods rejected by the buyer) before
entering into the contract with respect to defects which an examina-
tion ought to have revealed to him, or (3) by a course of dealing,
a course of performance or a usage of the trade.161 Warranties,
whether express or implied, are to be construed as consistent with
each other and as cumulative.162 If this construction is unreason-
able, the intention of the parties shall determine which warranty
is dominant; and rules are established for determining that inten-
tion.
Unconscionability
Another innovation of the Code is its incorporation, in section
2-302, of the concept of unconscionability. It may apply to an entire
contract or to a single clause or term. The concept has been recog-
nized by the Nebraska court163 and has been applied by courts of
other jurisdictions. 164 Decisions dealing with it have involved the
elements of oppressiveness or of unfair surprise.6 5
Under the Code, if the court, as a matter of law, finds a contract
or any clause in it to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract or may enforce
it without the unconscionable clause. When it is claimed, or when
it appears to the court, that a contract or any clause thereof may
101 U.C.C. § 2-316 (2).
102 U.C.C. § 2-317. In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Independent Metal Products Co.,
99 F.Supp. 862, 870 (D. Neb. 1951), the court held that it would violate
the intention of the parties to imply warranties in a sales contract con-
taining express warranties (a guaranty of freedom from defects of
workmanship and material for a period of one year with limitation of
obligation to repair or replacement), which were in their nature incon-
sistent with the warranties which would have been implied. The case
was affirmed in 203 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1953) on a theory of non-reliance.
163 Standard Oil Co. v. O'Hare, 126 Neb. 11, 15-16, 252 N.W. 398, 400 (1934).
164 In Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948), the court
refused to decree specific performance of a contract between a soup
company and carrot growers solely because of unconscionability resting
in want of reciprocity. The doctrine has also been applied by the
Illinois courts. Lear v. Chouteau, 23 Ill. 39 (1859); Marshall Milling Co.
v. Rosenbluth, 231 Ill. App. 325 (1924).
165 See cases cited in Official Comment 1 to § 2-302.
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be unconscionable, the parties are to be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial purpose and
effect.
Options Respecting Cooperation
Another provision of general application in determining the
obligation of the parties is that an agreement, otherwise sufficiently
definite to be a contract, is not rendered invalid by reason of the
fact that it leaves particulars of performance to be specified by
one of the parties.'6 6 Any specification must be made in good
faith and within the limits set by commercial reasonableness.
Special Situations
Finally, part 3 deals with the obligations of the parties in
special situations with respect to which it is possible, by reason
of space limitations, to note only the fact of coverage.
Requirements, output and exclusive dealing contracts are
recognized in section 2-306, which adopts the better reasoned com-
mon law of the collective jurisdictions, including that of Ne-
braska. 167
Sales familiarly known as "sale on approval" and "sale or
return" are covered comprehensively by sections 2-326 and 2-327.
These sections deal with the rights of creditors of both parties and
the risk of loss. Section 2-326 also deals with "sales on consignment"
or "sales on memorandum" and makes such a sale the equivalent
of a "sale or return" with respect to the claims of creditors of the
person conducting the business, unless the person making delivery
complies with the requirements of the section.
The final section, 2-328, deals with auctions. It is basically a
rewriting in expanded form of the Uniform Sales Act Section 21.
(4) Tr=I, CREDITORS AND GOOD FAiTH PARTNERS
Part 4 deals with the concept of title and the rights of third
parties-i.e., creditors and good faith purchasers-with respect to
the goods. This grouping is entirely logical in view of the Code's
approach to the concept of title.
166 U.C.C. § 2-311.
-67 Ansbacher-Siegle Corp v. Miller Chem. Co., 137 Neb. 142, 288 N.W. 538
(1939); C. W. Hull Co. v. Westerfield, 107 Neb. 705, 186 N.W. 992 (1922).
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Title
The Code deals with the sales contract on an issue by issue
basis, not on a title or "lump-concept" basis. To illustrate, one
possible issue between parties to a sales contract-i.e., the buyer
and the seller-is who bore the risk of loss of the goods, particularly
an uninsured risk. Two Code sections expressly answer this ques-
tion.168 It is not resolved by determining which party held the title
to the goods as it would have been under the Sales Act.169 Similarily,
the right of the seller to an action for the price of the goods does
not, under the Code, depend upon whether the property has passed
to the buyer, as it did primarily under the Sales Act,' 70 but on
other factors, including whether the buyer has accepted the goods.171
Similarly, the buyer's remedies do not depend upon whether the
property has passed to him, but upon whether the Code affords
him a remedy in the situation. Accordingly, as section 2-401 states,
each provision of Article 2 with regard to the rights, obligations
and remedies of the seller, the buyer, the purchaser or third parties
applies irrespective of title with the exception of provisions ex-
pressly referring to title.
Consequently, in approaching a sales problem under the Code,
the practitioner should first determine whether an express Code
provision covers the particular issue with which he is concerned.
If the issue is between buyer and seller, Article 2 probably deals
with that issue. If the issue is one between one of the parties to
a contract and a third party, or one between third parties who are
strangers to the sales contract, Article 2 may contain a provision
covering the situation; 172 but in many, if not most, cases reference
to section 2-401, the general section on title, will probably be
necessary. Questions such as to whom the goods are taxable,
who has an insurable interest in them, and whether there is
criminal liability for theft of the goods, may, and probably must,
be resolved by reference to section 2-401.
168 U.C.C. § 2-509, 2-510.
169 USA §§ 19 and 22. Goedeker v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 171 Neb. 532, 106
N.W.2d 679 (1960), was an action for a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine who bore the risk of an insured loss and was resolved by resort to
USA § 22 (2).
170 USA § 63.
171 U.C.C. § 2-709.
172 E.g., in the case of sales on approval, sale or return, and sales on con-
signment or on memorandum, the risk of loss and the rights of creditors
are covered by §§ 2-326 and 2-327.
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In general, the rules with respect to passage of title under the
Code are restated in subsections (2) and (3) of section 2-401
substantially as they existed under the Sales Act.1'7 3 Title to the
goods can not in any case pass under a contract for sale prior to
their identification to the contract. 7 4 Unless otherwise explicitly
agreed, the buyer acquires by identification a special property as
limited by the Code.
Creditors
Section 2-402 deals with the rights of the creditors of the
seller against goods which he has sold. Only one change from
prior law, a desirable one, is made. As under the Sales Act 1 75 a
creditor may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a contract
as void if, as against him, a retention of possession by the seller
is fraudulent under any rule of Nebraska law. 7 6 The new exception
to this rule is that retention of possession in good faith in the
current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially
reasonable time after a sale or identification is not fraudulent.
Good Faith Purchasers; Entrusting.
The greatest change from prior law with respect to the rights
of third parties in the goods is found in section 2403. After codify-
ing several decisions (including some Nebraska decisions) dealing
with the power of a person with voidable title to transfer good
title to a good faith purchaser for value, in situations where the
transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, the
delivery was in exchange for a check which was later dishonored,177
or the transaction was to be a cash sale, or the delivery was pro-
cured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal
law,'78 the section creates new law with its statement of the
concept of entrustment.
173 USA § 19.
174 The concept of identification is outlined in U.C.C. § 2-501.
175 USA § 26.
176 U.C.C. § 2-402 (2).
177 The Nebraska court has ruled several times in accord with U.C.C. § 2-
403(1) in this situation: Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v. South Soo
Grain Co., 172 Neb. 426, 109 N.W.2d 728 (1961); Sullivan Co. v. Larson,
149 Neb. 97, 30 N.W.2d 460 (1948); Parr v. Helfrich, 108 Neb. 801, 189
N.W. 281 (1922) (purported certified check which proved to be forged).
The rule of this line of decisions was applied in Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89
F.Supp. 317 (D. Neb. 1950).
-78 The four situations are encompassed in U.C.C. § 2-403 (1).
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Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals
in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of
the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.179 Thus,
the owner of a precious timepiece who leaves it for repair with
a jeweler in the business of selling timepieces enables the jeweler
to pass good title to the timepiece to a buyer in ordinary course
of business. 8 0 Entrusting includes any delivery and any acquies-
cence in retention of possession, regardless of any condition ex-
pressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence, and
irrespective of whether the procurement of the entrusting of the
possessor's disposition of the goods are larcenous under the criminal
law.181 The rule that a thief can not pass good title182 is, however,
not changed.
(5) PMFORMANCE
Part 5 details the manner of performance of the obligations
of the buyer and seller as established in part 3.
Identification
Before the seller can perform his obligation, the goods which
are the subject of the contract of sale must be identified. The
concept of identification is stated in section 2-501. Essentially the
term "identified" is a substitution for the terms "ascertained" or
"specific" used in the Uniform Sales Act.' 8 3 Under the Code
identification can be made any time and in any manner explicitly
agreed to by the parties. In the absence of explicit agreement,
identification occurs (1) when the contract is made if it is one
for the sale of goods already existing and identified or (2) when
the goods are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the
seller as goods to which the contract refers, if the contract is
for the sale of future goods (other than crops or the unborn young
of animals) .184
179 U.C.C. § 2-403 (2), (3).
180 The term "buyer in ordinary course of business" is defined in U.C.C.
§ 1-201(9).
181 The concept of entrustment has roots in Nebraska decisional law. See
Terry Bros. & Meves v. National Auto Ins. Co., 160 Neb. 110, 69 N.W.2d
361 (1955); Oleson v. Albers, 130 Neb. 823, 266 N.W. 632 (1936).
18 2.Allstate Ins. Co. v. Enzolera, 164 Neb. 38, 81 N.W.2d 588 (1957).
183 USA §§ 17, 18 and 19.
184 Also in the case of crops, when the contract is for the sale of crops to
be harvested within twelve months or the next normal harvest season
after contracting, whichever is longer, when the crops are planted or
otherwise become growing crops; and in the case of unborn young of
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The buyer obtains a special property and an insurable interest
in goods by the identification of existing goods as goods to which
the contract refers even though the goods so identified do not
conform to the contract and the buyer has an option to return or
to reject them. The seller retains an insurable interest in the
goods so long as title to or any security interest in them remains
in him. Where identification is made by the seller alone, he may,
until default, insolvency or notification to the buyer that the
identification is final, substitute other goods for those identified.
Buyer's rights to goods on seller's insolvency
Although the subject matter might seem more appropriately
covered in Part 7-Remedies,: 5 the buyer's right to recover goods
upon the insolvency of the seller is established in section 2-502.
Even though the goods have not been shipped, a buyer who has
paid a part or all of the price of the goods in which he has a
special property under section 2-501 may, on making and keeping
good a tender of any unpaid portion of their price, recover them
from the seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after
receipt of the first installment on their price.186 If the identification
creating the special property has been made by the buyer, he
animals to be born within twelve months after contracting, when the
young are conceived. Compare this rule with that under pre-Code Ne-
braska decisional law that a mortgage of crops to be grown, Cole v. Kerr,
19 Neb. 553, 26 N.W. 598 (1886), or animals to be acquired, Battle Creek
Valley Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 62 Neb. 825, 88 N.W. 145 (1901), is
invalid against creditors.
185For the reason that part 7, in § 2-702, specifies the seller's remedies on
discovery of the buyer's insolvency, one would perhaps expect to find
this corresponding right of the buyer upon the seller's insolvency among
the sections dealing with the buyer's remedies upon breach (§§ 2-710
through 2-717). However, the draftsmen probably placed it in juxta posi-
tion to § 2-501, since the buyer's right is necessarily tied to identification
-i.e., identification of the goods distinguishes him from a general ceditor
of the insolvent seller.
186 This remedy is more likely to be asserted against the seller's trustee
in bankruptcy than it is against the seller himself. There is thus a
possible conflict between this section and § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 96 (1952). See Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles
2 and 3, 14 RuTf.GERS L. REV. 518, 556-59 (1960). As a practical matter,
however, if the buyer has not paid the greater portion of the price to
the seller he can probably induce the trustee to deliver the goods upon
payment of the balance of the purchase price due, since the recovery
by the estate in bankruptcy of the unpaid portion of the price will
frequently exceed any price offered for the goods at a liquidation
bankruptcy sale.
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acquires the right to recover the goods only if they conform to the
contract.
Tender of delivery and shipment
The details of the seller's obligation of tender of delivery and
shipment are specified in sections 2-503, 2-504, 2-505 and 2-507.
These sections are mostly an elaboration upon the corresponding
provisions of the Sales Act, including the gloss of decisional law
upon those provisions.
The basic obligation in the tender of delivery is that the
seller place and hold conforming goods at the buyer's disposition
and give the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable
him to take delivery.8 7 Where shipment of goods is contemplated
or required, the rules with respect thereto are detailed.188 There
are explicit rules governing delivery where goods are in the pos-
session of a bailee and are to be delivered without being moved8 9
and where the contract requires the seller to deliver documents
covering the goods. 0° As under the Sales Act, tender of delivery
is a condition precedent prior to the buyer's duty to accept the
goods and, unless it is otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for
them.' 91
Right to cure defective performance
Another novelty of the Code is section 2-508 which gives the
seller the right to cure an improper tender of delivery in certain
situations both prior to and after the time for performance. While
novel to statutory law, the section derives support from decisional
law of long standing in several jurisdictions.192 Because the re-
187 U.C.C. § 2-503(1); USA § 51.
188 U.C.C. §§ 2-503 (2) and (3), 2-504 and 2-505. The Code treats the "ship-
ment" contract as the regular type and the "destination" contract as
the variant type. See Official Comment 5 to § 2-503.
189 U.C.C. § 2-503 (4) ; USA § 43 (3).
190 U.C.C. § 2-503 (5).
19' U.C.C. § 2-507 (1) ; USA §§ 11 (2), 41 and 42.
192 Decisional law dealing with cure before or at the time of performance:
Standard Mfg. Co. v. Slaughter, 122 Ill. App. 479 (1905); Wright v.
Larsen Bros. Wholesale Grocery Co., 115 Kan. 550, 223 Pac. 1108 (1924);
Emerson Shoe Co. v. Neely, 99 W.Va. 657, 129 S.E. 718 (1925). Decisional
law dealing with cure after the time for performance: Colvin v. Weed-
man, 50 Ill. 311 (1869); Mutual Chem. Co. of America v. Marden, Orth
& Hastings Co., 235 N.Y. 145, 139 N.E. 221 (1923); Whitla v. Moore, 164
Pa. 451, 30 Atl. 257 (1894).
A contractual right of cure may also be provided, as in Muller v.
Keeley, 165 Neb. 243, 85 N.W. 2d 309 (1957).
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quirement of good faith exists with respect to the first tender, 19 3
it does not seem that this section is subject to criticism on the
ground that it sanctions "deliveries by the trial and error
method."'04
Risk of loss
Risk of loss during the process of delivery of the goods is
covered comprehensively in sections 2-509 and 2-510. The former
section covers the normal (non-breach) situation; the latter, the
breach situation. In the normal situation the risk of loss falls
upon the same party upon whom it would have fallen under the
Sales Act'9 5 with one important qualification. In cases other than
where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the
goods by carrier or where the goods are held by a bailee to be
delivered without being moved, the risk of loss passes to the buyer
on receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the
risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery. The rationale of the
Code rule is that the merchant seller in possession is likely to
have insurance coverage. 90 In the breach situation, the risk of
loss is upon the breaching party to the extent of any deficiency
in effective insurance coverage on the part of the other party.
Tender of payment; inspection
Unless otherwise agreed, tender of payment by the buyer is
a condition to the seller's duty to tender or complete delivery. 9 7
Tender of payment is sufficient when it is made by any means
or in any manner current in the ordinary course of business unless
the seller demands payment in legal tender and gives any extension
193 U.C.C. § 1-203.
194 See Hageman v. Ule, 188 Wis. 617, 620, 206 N.W. 842, 843 (1926).
195 Under Uniform Sales Act § 22 risk of loss followed title. When the
property in the goods was transferred to the buyer, the goods were at
the buyer's risk whether delivery had been made or not (with quali-
fications not material here). Thus, for example, under USA § 19, Rule
2, a buyer purchasing a suit from a clothier, the clothier agreeing to
make alterations would have the risk of loss of the goods from the
time the clothier completed alterations, even though the buyer did
not receive the goods until later. Under the Code the risk is not upon
the buyer until he receives the goods, for reasons stated in the text.
The same result reached under the Sales Act in Storz Brewing
Co. v. Brown, 154 Neb. 204, 47 N.W.2d 407 (1951), a loss in transit
rendering goods unsalable, should be reached under U.C.C. § 2-503(1).
196 See Official Comment 3 to § 2-509.
197 U.C.C. § 2-511 (1). This continues the rule under USA § 42.
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of time reasonably necessary in which to procure it. 198 Thus, if
the seller at the last moment makes a surprise demand for cash,
he must give an extension of time for performance reasonably
necessary to procure the cash.
Unless otherwise agreed, 99 the buyer has a right, before pay-
ment or acceptance of any draft, to inspect tendered goods at any
reasonable place and in any reasonable manner.20 0 In situations
where the contract requires payment before inspection, non-
conformity of the goods does not excuse the buyer from making
payment unless the non-conformity appears without inspection or
in the situation where, despite tender of required documents, the
circumstances would justify an injunction against honor in cases
of a letter of credit involving fraud or forgery.20 1 Payment by the
buyer, where he is obligated to pay before inspection, does not
constitute an acceptance of goods or impair his right to inspect
or any of his remedies.20 2
In sales effected through documents, documents against which
a draft is drawn are to be delivered to the buyer-drawee directly
on acceptance of the draft if it is payable more than three days
after presentment; otherwise, the documents are to be delivered
only on payment of the draft °.20
Preservation of evidence of goods in dispute
Another novel provision, section 2-515, is that in furtherance
of any adjustment of money claim or dispute either party, upon
reasonable notification to the other party and for the purpose
of ascertaining facts and preserving evidence, has the right to
inspect, test and sample goods, including those in the possession
or control of the other party. The parties may agree to a third
198U.C.C. § 2-511(2). This is a departure from the rule stated and applied
in a pre-Sales Act decision, Behrends v. Beyschlag, 50 Neb. 304, 69
N.W. 835 (1897) (instruction using "cash" was proper, since it meant
coin or currency as opposed to a draft or a check).
199 Le., where the transaction is by means of documents, payment is due
at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the documents,
regardless of where the goods are to be received. U.C.C. §§ 2-310(c)
and 2-513 (3).
200 U.C.C. § 2-513 (1).
201 U.C.C. § 2-512(1), which incorporates by reference the provisions of
§ 5-114, which deals with an injunction against honor in the described
situations.
202 U.C.C. § 2-511(2).
203 U.C.C. § 2-514, which restates in condensed form the rule in UBLA § 41.
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party's inspection of the goods and may also agree that findings
of a third party will be binding upon them in any subsequent
litigation.
(6) BREACH, REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE
The Code expands considerably the content of the Sales Act
dealing with the matter of breach, repudiation and excuse. Two
particularly noteworthy changes from prior law are effected.
Buyer's rights on improper delivery
One of these two changes is found in section 2-601, which
defines the buyer's rights on improper delivery. Subject to certain
other provisions of Article 2,204 if the goods or the tender of delivery
fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a)
reject the whole, (b) accept the whole, or (c) accept any com-
mercial unit or units and reject the rest. Formerly, if the buyer
accepted any commercial units, he ran the risk of being held
to an acceptance of the whole.205 The Code should, therefore,
diminish the frequency of litigation as to whether or not the con-
tract of sale is divisible. The argument of divisibility of the entire
contract was the one the buyer was forced to make if he accepted
only part of the units of an entire contract or a delivery prior to
the Code and sought to avoid liability for the whole.
If the buyer rejects the goods, he must do so within such a
reasonable time after their delivery or tender and seasonably
notify the seller.206 A buyer in physical possession and without a
security interest in the goods must hold the goods with reasonable
care at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to permit the
seller to remove them. But, unless the buyer is a merchant,20 7 he
has no further obligation.208
A merchant buyer is under a duty, after rejection, to follow
reasonable instructions from the seller with respect to the goods
204 I.e., §§ 2-612 (breach in installment sales) and 2-718 and 2-719 (con-
tractual limitation of remedy).
205 For example, in Reno Sales Co. v. Prichard Industries, Inc., 178 F.2d
279 (7th Cir. 1949), a merchant buyer of wastebaskets shipped in in-
dividual sealed cartons in twelve shipments, resold three shipments and
was held liable for the price of all twelve shipments nothwithstanding
a claim of breach of warranty and a retender of six shipments to the
seller.
206 U.C.C. § 2-602 (1).
207 See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
208 U.C.C. § 2-602 (2).
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and in the absence of such instructions must make reasonable
efforts to sell them for the seller's account if they are perishable
or threaten to decline in value speedily.2 9 When the merchant
buyer sells goods pursuant to this procedure, he is entitled to re-
imbursement from the seller out of the proceeds of the sale for
reasonable expenses for caring for and selling the goods.210 If the
seller gives no instructions within a reasonable time after notifica-
tion of rejection, the buyer may (a) store the rejected goods for
the seller's account, (b) reship them to the seller, or (c) resell
them for seller's account.2 "1
The buyer's failure to state, in connection with rejection, a
particular defect which was ascertainable by reasonable inspec-
tion precludes him from relying upon the unstated defect to justify
rejection or to establish breach where the seller could have cured
it if the objection had been stated seasonably.212 Between mer-
chants"' 3 the buyer's failure to state his objections when the seller
has, after rejection, made a request in writing for a full and final
written statement of all defects on which the buyer proposes to
rely, will likewise preclude him from relying on unstated defects
to justify rejection or to establish breach.214 The principle is
extended to documents. Payment against documents made without
reservation of rights precludes recovery for payment for defects
apparent on the face of the documents. 215
Acceptance
Acceptance and its consequences are fully specified.21 Ac-
ceptance occurs (a) when the buyer, after a reasonable opportunity
to inspect the goods, signifies to the seller that the goods are
conforming or that he will retain them in spite of non-conformity,
209 U.C.C. § 2-603(1), which codifies the well known decision in Descalzi
Fruit Co. v. William S. Sweet & Son, Inc., 30 R.I. 320, 75 Atl. 308 (1910).
Subsection (3) of this section reinforces the buyer's duty by providing
that his good faith action does not constitute acceptance or subject him
to damages.
210 U.C.C. § 2-603 (2). Also, if the expenses include no selling commission,
the buyer is entitled to such a commission as is usual in the trade or,
if none, to a reasonable sum not exceeding 10% of the gross proceeds.
211 U.C.C. § 2-604.
212U.C.C. § 2-605(1) (a).
213 See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
214 U.C.C. § 2-605(1) (b).
215 U.C.C. § 2-605 (2).
216 U.C.C. §§ 2-606 and 2-607.
NEBRASKA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(b) when the buyer fails to make an effective rejection,217 which
cannot occur until he has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect
the goods, or (c) when the buyer does any action inconsistent with
the seller's ownership and the seller ratifies the action as an
acceptance.218 Acceptance of any part of any commercial unit is
an acceptance of that entire unit.219
The consequences of acceptance are, as before, that the buyer
must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted.22 0 Acceptance
by the buyer precludes the rejection of goods accepted; and if
acceptance was made with knowledge of a non-conformity, it can-
not be revoked because of that non-conformity unless acceptance
was upon the reasonable assertion that the non-conformity would
be seasonably cured. Acceptance does not of itself, however, impair
any other remedy provided by Article 2 for non-conformity-i.e.,
damages. In the case of accepted goods, the buyer must within a
reasonable time after he has accepted the goods notify the seller
of any claimed breach or be barred from any further remedy.22 '
If the claim is one for infringement (under section 2-312) and the
buyer is sued as a result of a breach, the buyer must, in addition,
notify the seller within a reasonable time after he receives notice
of the litigation or be barred from any remedy for any liability
established by the litigation.
As under the Sales Act the burden remains upon the buyer
to establish any breach.
222
Revocation of acceptance
Because of the confusion and the harsh results associated
with the doctrine of rescission,223 the Code eliminates that word
and substitutes for it, in section 2-608, the concept of revocation
of acceptance. The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or
of a commercial unit whose non-conformity impairs its value sub-
21 Le., he fails to reject within a reasonable time after delivery or tender
of the goods or he fails to seasonably notify the seller. U.C.C. § 2-602(1).
218 U.C.C. § 2-606 (1).
219 U.C.C. § 2-606 (2). The provision is needed by reason of the option given
the buyer in § 2-601(c).
220 U.C.C. § 2-607 (1), which continues the rule of USA § 44.
221 U.C.C. § 2-607(3), which continues the rule of USA § 49 with respect
to the requirement of notice to the seller of the claimed breach.
222 U.C.C. § 2-607(4). See Dodds v. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co., 62
Neb. 759, 87 N.W. 911 (1901).
223 See Official Comment 1 to § 2-608.
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stantially if he accepted it upon the reasonable assumption that
its non-conformity would be cured but has not been seasonably
cured or if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assur-
ances.
Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for
it and before any substantial change in the condition of the goods
not caused by their own defects. Notification of the seller of the
fact of revocation is necessary.
A buyer who properly revokes has the same rights and duties
with respect to the goods as though he had rejected them. Under
the Code the buyer may revoke his acceptance of the goods, return
them to the seller, and sue for damages.224 A different result should,
therefore, be reached under the Code on the facts in Henry v.
Rudge & Guenzel Co. 225 in which a purchaser of a pair of ladies'
shoes with a defective heel who had returned them to the selling
store for credit on the purchase price was held to have rescinded
the transaction and thereby to be without a cause of action for
personal injury occasioned by the defect.
Right to adequate assurance of performance
Another innovation in the law of sales is introduced in section
2-609-the right of each party that his expectation of receiving
due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds
for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either
party,226 the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of
due performance, and until he receives it, may, if it is commercially
reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already
received the agreed return. Between merchants reasonableness of
grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered
224 See U.C.C. §§ 2-608, 2-711, 2-715, and 2-720.
225 118 Neb. 260, 224 N.W. 294 (1929). The case was decided under the Sales
Act and the result was rested squarely upon § 69 (1) (d) and (2).
Section 2-608 eliminates USA § 69 (2) from the Code.
226 Reasonable grounds for insecurity are defined by commercial rather
than legal standards. Illustrations are cited in Offical Comment 3 to
§ 2-609. A buyer who falls behind in his account with the seller, even
though the items involved relate to separate and legally distinct con-
tracts, impairs the seller's expectation of due performance. Also a buyer
who requires precision parts which he intends to use immediately upon
delivery may have reasonable grounds for insecurity if he learns that
his seller is making defective deliveries of such parts to other buyers
with similar needs.
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are determined according to commercial standards. After receipt
of a justified demand from the other party, a failure to provide
adequate assurance of due performance within a reasonable time
(not exceeding thirty days) constitutes a repudiation.
Repudiation
The common law doctrine of anticipatory repudiation 227 is
incorporated into the Code with perhaps one modification. When
either party repudiates the contract with respect to a performance
not yet due, the loss of which will substantially impair the value
of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party has three alterna-
tives: (a) he may for a commercially reasonable time await per-
formance by the repudiating party; (b) he may resort to any
remedy for breach even though he has notified the repudiating
party that he would await the latter's performance and has urged
retraction; and (c) in either case he may suspend his own per-
formance. 2 8 Prior law is changed to the extent that a commercially
reasonable time is, or may be, less than the date of performance.229
The repudiating party can, however, before his next per-
formance is due, retract his repudiation unless the aggrieved party
has since cancelled, changed his position or otherwise indicated
that he considers the repudiation final.230 Retraction may be by
any method clearly indicating that the repudiating party intends
to perform but must include any adequate assurance of performance
justifiably demanded. 231 Retraction reinstates the repudiating
party's rights under the contract.
Installment contracts
The installment contract breach is one related to the doctrine
of anticipatory breach. An installment contract is defined as one
which requires or authorizes the delivery of goods in separate
lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract contains
227 Lang v. Todd, 148 Neb. 726, 28 N.W.2d 434 (1947); Fahey v. Updike
Elevator Co., 102 Neb. 249, 166 N.W. 622 (1918); J. K. Armsby Co. v.
Raymond Bros.-Clarke Co., 90 Neb. 553, 134 N.W. 174 (1912).
228U.C.C. § 2-610. Accord, as to paragraph (c), Chermak v. Smolik, 112
Neb. 54, 198 N.W. 562 (1924) (involving real estate).
229 See cases cited in note 227 supra.
230 U.C.C. § 2-611.
231 An illustration is Refrigeradora Del Noroeste S. A. v. Appelbaum, 248
F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 901 (1958) (seller with-
drew by telegram statement that the contract was at an end).
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a clause "each delivery is a separate contract" or its equivalent. 23 2
The buyer may reject any non-conforming installment if the non-
conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and
cannot be cured. Whenever non-conformity or default with respect
to one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the
whole contract, there is a breach of the whole.234 Language of
impairment of the value of the whole is thus substituted for
language of materiality of breach which appeared in Uniform Sales
Act Section 45.
Excuse
The final four sections of part 6 deal with relatively infrequent
situations, but ones concerning which the practitioner should be
aware.
Casualty to identified goods, where the contract requires for
its performance goods identified when the contract is made and
the goods thereafter suffer casualty without fault of either party
before the risk of loss passes to the buyer, is covered in section
2-613, which gives the buyer a more favorable option than he had
under sections 7 and 8 of the Uniform Sales Act.
Substituted performance is required by section 2-614 in certain
circumstances where the method of transportation provided in the
contract becomes commercially impracticable and a commercially
reasonable substitute is available. Also, if the agreed means or
manner of payment fails because of domestic or foreign govern-
mental regulation, the seller may withhold or stop delivery unless
the buyer provides a means or manner of payment that is com-
mercially a substantial equivalent.235
Excuse by failure of presupposed conditions is the matter of
the last two sections of part 6.236 Where a delay in delivery or a
non-delivery in whole or in part has been made impracticable by
the occurrence of a contingency, the non-occurrence of which was
the basic assumption on which the contract was made, or by com-
pliance in good faith with an applicable domestic or foreign govern-
22 U.C.C. § 2-612 (1).
233 U.C.C. § 2-612 (2).
24 U.C.C. § 2-612 (3).
235 If delivery has already taken place, payment by means or in the means
provided by the regulation discharges the buyer's obligation unless the
regulation "is discriminatory, oppressive or predatory". U.C.C. § 2-
614(2).
2 36 U.C.C. §§ 2-615 and 2-616.
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mental regulation, a seller allocating production and deliveries
among his customers in a fair and reasonable manner is excused,
provided he gives the buyer notice.237 The buyer may then termi-
nate or modify the contract as to any unexecuted portion.
238
(7) RE EDIEs
The final part of Article 2 deals, appropriately enough, with
litigation on the sales contract. In addition to expanding the
remedies of both the seller and the buyer available under the Uni-
form Sales Act, Part 7 enlarges the content of the Sales Act by its in-
clusion of the subject matter of contractual modifications with
respect to damages and remedies, rules of evidence and procedure,
and a statute of limitations. The practitioner with litigation in-
volving a sales contract must take cognizance of part 7.
Seller's remedies.
The seller's remedies upon breach by the buyer are catalogued
in section 2-703. Upon breach2 9 by the buyer, the seller may
(a) withhold delivery of the goods,
(b) stop delivery by any bailee under section 2-705,
(c) proceed under section 2-704 respecting goods still un-
identified to the contract,
(d) resell and recover damages under section 2-706,
(e) recover damages for non-acceptance (section 2-708) or
in a proper case the price (section 2-709),
(f) cancel.240
The seller's right of stoppage in transit is broadened by the
Code. The right is extended to breach situations other than in-
solvency in the case of carload, truckload or planeload, or larger
shipments of express or freight. Under the Sales Act the seller's
right of stoppage was limited to the insolvency situation.241 The
237 U.C.C. § 2-615.
238 U.C.C. § 2-616. Upon receipt of the notice required by § 2-615 the buyer
may terminate and thereby discharge any unexecuted portion of the
contract or modify the contract by agreeing to take his available quota
in such situation. If the buyer fails to modify the contract within a
reasonable time (not exceeding 30 days) after receipt of the notice,
the contract lapses with respect to any deliveries effected.
239 As stated in § 2-703.
240The seller had a right to cancel under certain circumstances under
USA § 65, phrased in terms of rescission. As to this term, see note 271
infra and accompanying text.
241 USA § 57.
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right is also expanded by extending it from carriers to other
bailees.242
The seller's right to complete manufacture of unfinished goods
is also broadened by the Code. In the exercise of reasonable com-
mercial judgment for the purpose of avoiding loss and of effective
realization, the seller may either complete the manufacture and
wholly identify the goods to the contract or cease manufacture
and resell for scrap or salvage value or proceed in any other reason-
able manner.243 The Code thereby permits a more practical result
than the Uniform Sales Act.244
Likewise, the seller's remedy of resale is considerably ex-
panded. Under the Sales Act 245 an unpaid seller could resell only
if the goods were perishable, if the seller had expressly reserved
the right of resale or if the buyer had been in default an unreason-
able length of time. Under section 2-706 the seller may resell the
goods after any breach by a buyer subject only to the criterion
that he act in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.
Compliance with the resale procedure established by section 2-706
sets the measure of the seller's damage (plus any allowable inci-
dental damages). The price realized on resale is, therefore, not
merely evidence of that damage.246 Under the Code resale is the
seller's primary remedy.
The seller's right to damages for non-acceptance or repudia-
tion, set out in section 2-708, is substantially the same as it was
under the Sales Act.247 Also a seller who does not comply with the
242 USA § 58, which, although it uses the term "other bailee" qualifies it
with the phrase "for the purpose of transmission to the buyer."
243 U.C.C. § 2-704.
244 Under USA § 64(4) if, while labor or expense of a material amount
was necessary on the party of the seller to enable him to fulfill his
obligations under the contract, the buyer repudiated the contract or
notified the seller to proceed no further therewith, the buyer was
liable to the seller for no greater damages than the seller would have
suffered if he had done nothing towards carrying out the contract
after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation or countermand. It
was thus clearly risky for a seller to complete manufacture, even
though from a commercial standpoint that might have resulted in the
greatest salvage.
245 USA § 60.
246U.C.C. § 2-706(1). See Official Comment 2 to § 2-706. Cf. the pre-
Sales Act decision, Adolph Goldmark & Sons v. Simon Bros. Co., 110
Neb. 614, 194 N.W. 686 (1923).
247USA §§ 64(2), (3). The text is clarified and amplified under the Code.
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requirements of section 2-706 on resale and cannot therefore use
the measure of damages under that section may recover damages
under section 2-708.24s
The occasions for the remedy of an action for the price are
probably reduced under the Code. Under the Sales Act an action
for the price would lie if title to the goods had passed or an ap-
pointed day for payment of the price had been made.249 Under
section 2-709 an action for the price lies where (a) the goods have
been accepted, (b) a commercially reasonable time has passed after
the risk of loss of conforming goods has passed to the buyer, (c)
where the seller is unable to sell goods identified to the contract
at a reasonable price, or (d) where circumstances indicate that
an effort to sell goods identified to the contract will be unavail-
ing.250 The right to recover the price of unaccepted goods is thus
divorced from the concept of title and is made to depend upon the
seller's ability to resell.
The seller's remedies on discovery of the buyer's insolvency are
also broadened. As under the Sales Act,25' the seller may refuse
delivery except for cash, including payment for all goods thereto-
fore delivered, and may stop goods in transit. However, where the
Sales Act did not provide a remedy for the seller in the case of a
buyer receiving goods on credit while insolvent, the Code does-
an exclusive one.252 If the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent, the seller may reclaim them on demand made within
ten days of the buyer's receipt of them. However, if a misrepresen-
tation of solvency was made to the particular seller in writing with-
in three months before delivery, the ten-day limitation has no ap-
plication.25 3 The seller's right to reclaim is subject to the rights
248 See Official Comment 2 to § 2-706.
249 USA § 63. The remedy assumes, of course, a wrongful refusal to pay.
250 U.C.C. § 2-709 (1).
251 USA § 53, 54, 55 and 57.
252U.C.C. § 2-702(2). In Pekin Plow Co. v. Wilson, 66 Neb. 115, 92 N.W.
176 (1902), the court followed the rule that where goods are sold on
credit on fraudulent representations of the buyer, the seller can rescind
the sale and replevy the goods within a reasonable time after discovery
of the fraud. The seller had assertedly relied on a false written state-
ment to a credit agency, followed up by personal inquiry on the seller's
part.
253 In this situation the right to reclaim will generally be exercised against
the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy. For a discussion of the problems in-
volved, see Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14
RUTGERs L. REV. 518, 549-56 (1960).
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of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien
creditor.25
Buyer's remedies
The remedies of the buyer upon breach by the seller are cata-
logued in section 2-711. Where the seller fails to make delivery
or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes
acceptance with respect to the goods involved (and with respect
to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract), the buyer
may cancel and, whether or not he has done so, may, in addition
to recovering any part of the price paid, (a) cover and have dam-
ages under section 2-712 as to all goods affected whether or not
they have been identified to the contract, or (b) recover damages
for non-delivery under section 2-713. Where the seller fails to de-
liver or repudiates, the buyer may also, (a) if the goods have been
identified, recover them as provided in secton 2-502, or (b), in a
proper case, obtain specific performance or replevy the goods under
section 2-716. As under the Sales Act,25 5 the buyer has, on rightful
rejection or justifible revocation of acceptance, a security interest
in goods in his possession or control for any payments on the price
and any expenses incurred in connection with them.2 5 6
The buyer's right to cover refers to his "making in good faith
and without unreasonable delay any, reasonable purchase of or
contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the
seller. 25 7 While this remedy is new to statutory law, it is one well
established in decisional law.258
The rule for measuring the buyer's damages in cases of non-
delivery and repudiation is changed from the "difference between
the contract price and the market or current price of the goods
at the time or times when they ought to have been delivered 259
to "the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the
breach and the contract price. '260
254 U.C.C. § 2-702 (3).
255 USA § 69 (5).
256 U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
257 U.C.C. § 2-712 (1).
25s Fahey v. Updike Elevator Co., 102 Neb. 249, 166 N.W. 622 (1918).
259 USA § 67 (3).
200 U.C.C. § 2-713 (1). In the case of non-delivery the time will be the same
as under USA § 67 (3), since non-delivery will occur at the time set for
delivery. However, in the case of a repudiation taking the form of an
announced intention not to perform, the buyer "learns of the breach"
when he within a commercially reasonable period of time, not exceeding
the date of performance, elects to treat the statement as a breach. See
U.C.C. § 2-610.
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No change is made in the rule respecting damages for breach
in regard to accepted goods.261 Where the buyer has accepted and
given notification to the seller as required in section 2-607(3), he
may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach.
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is, as before, the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value
of the accepted goods and the value they would have had had they
been as warranted, absent special circumstances showing damages
in a different amount.2
62
The buyer may also recover incidental and consequential dam-
ages in most cases.2
63
The remedy of specific performance is broadened since it may
be decreed where the goods are unique or "in other proper cir-
cumstances. '264 Under the Sales Act 265 the remedy was available
where the contract was to deliver specific or ascertained goods.
The right of replevin exists in the case of goods identified to
the contract if the buyer is unable, after reasonable effort, to effect
cover for the goods or if circumstances reasonably indicate that the
effort will be unavailing.266
Finally, the buyer enjoys an expanded right to deduct from
any part of the price still owing damages resulting from any breach
of the sales contract.267 The right is conditioned upon the buyer's
giving the seller notice of his intention to do so. The Sales Act
expressly provided for recoupment of damages by the buyer only
in the case of breach of warranty.26
8
201U.C.C.§2-714(1); USA §§ 69(1) (a) and (6).
262 U.C.C. § 2-714(2) ; USA § 69(7).
263 U.C.C. § 2-715. Incidental damages include expenses reasonably incurred
in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods
rightfully rejected. Consequential damages include any loss resulting
from the general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contract had reason to know and which could not
have reasonably been prevented by cover or otherwise and injury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
264 U.C.C. § 2-716 (1). It is not limited to identified goods.
265 USA § 68.
266 U.C.C. § 2-716(3). The right is also available if the goods have been
shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in
them has been made or tendered.
267 U.C.C. § 2-717.
268 USA § 49.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 43, NO. 4
Contractual provisions as to remedies and damages
The Code sanctions, within limits established by the common
law, contractual provisions concerning (1) liquidation or limitation
of damages and (2) modifications or limitations of remedies.269
Remedies for fraud; use of term "rescission"
Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all
remedies available under Article 2 for a non-fraudulent breach.
2 7 0
A substantial change from prior Nebraska law is effected by
sections 2-720 and 2-721. Unless a contrary intention clearly ap-
pears, expressions of "cancellation" or "rescission" or the like are
not to be construed as a renunciation or discharge of a claim for
damages for antecedent breach.27'1 Neither rescission nor claim for
rescission nor rejection or return of the goods bars a claim for
damages or other remedy.
Procedure, evidence, and limitations
Liberal rules of suability are established with respect to third
parties dealing with goods which have been identified to a contract
for sale so as to cause an actionable injury to a party to that con-
tract.27
2
The Code also establishes rules for proof of the market price
where evidence of a price prevailing at times and places described
is not readily available. The substitute price is the one prevailing
within any reasonable time before or after the relevant time or at
any other place which in commercial judgment or under usage of
trade would serve as a reasonable substitute for the one described,
with proper allowances for the cost of transporting goods to or
from the other place.27 3
In accordance with prior Nebraska decisional law2 7 4 the Code
makes quotations of an established commodity market in official
publications or trade journals or newspapers or periodicals of gen-
269 U.C.C. §§ 2-718, 2-719.
270 U.C.C. § 2-721.
271 These provisions are counter to statements found in cases like Henry v.
Rudge & Guenzel Co., 118 Neb. 260, 224 N.W. 294 (1929), supra note
225 and accompanying text.
272 U.C.C. § 2-722.
273 U.C.C. § 2-723 (2).
274Fahey v. Updike Elevator Co., 102 Neb. 249, 166 N.W. 622 (1918) (dic-
tum).
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eral circulation which are published as reports of that market
admissible in evidence whenever the price or value of goods regu-
larly bought and sold in that market is in issue.2 75
The final section of part 7, section 2-725, establishes a statute
of limitations for contracts involving the sale of goods. An action
for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued.276 A cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs regardless of the aggrieved party's
lack of knowledge of the breach.277 This statute of limitations does
not apply to causes of action which have accrued before the Code
becomes effective in Nebraska.278 It will apply to a breach after
the effective date of the Code of a contract entered into before the
effective date of the Code, since the breach results in the accrual
of the cause of action.279
CONCLUSION
The Code is unquestionably a desirable advancement in Ne-
braska law. Article 2, in particular, effects a needed improvement
in the law of sales. It benefits the businessman engaged in buying
and selling personal property by modernizing the law to bring it
into alignment with current business practices. It establishes con-
fidence on his part that the practices he knows and understands
will be recognized by the law and enforced in court if necessary.
Article 2 is likewise of great advantage to the practicing lawyer,
particularly the practicing Nebraska lawyer. It establishes law in
numerous areas where there previously was none either in statute
or court decision. Article 2 thereby provides certainty in many
cases where previously uncertainty existed. Members of the Ne-
braska Bar can look forward with confidence to operation under
the Code. The author believes that they will like it.
275 U.C.C. § 2-724.
276 U.C.C. § 2-725 (1).
277 U.C.C. § 2-725 (2).
278 U.C.C. § 2-725 (4). Note may be taken that the general limitation pro-
visions applicable to written and oral contract were not expressly
amended to dovetail with the Code. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-205 to 206(Reissue 1958). Implied repeal of the latter by the Code pro tanto
may be found under § 10-103. Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works,
413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
279 U.C.C. § 2-725 (2). Also it seems clear that the breach is a separate event
under § 10-101.
